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COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICYt

Hugh Alan Ross*
l.

INTRODUCTION

of recent events makes it timely to reconsider certain
aspects of the relation between psychiatry and the law. In
the past decade, both the public and the legal profession have
been increasingly concerned with the impact of mental illness on
the law. In 1952, an outstanding text, Psychiatry and The Law,
was published as the joint effort of a lawyer and a psychiatrist.1
Two years later the Durham case laid down a new test of insanity
in criminal cases, rejecting the M'Naghten rule.2 Interest in the
case resulted in a host of law review articles, symposiums, and a
book on insanity and criminal responsibility. 3 In the tort area,
there is a clear trend toward recognition of mental suffering as a
legitimate element of damages, either with or without preceding
trauma. 4 Another example is the recent Bailey case, a landmark
decision in workmen's compensation law.5 The court said that even
though a statute defined "injury" as "harm to the physical structure of the body," work-connected mental illness is compensable,
since the body is a single interrelated functioning organism which
includes the mind.
In the area of hospitalization and treatment, it is now generally

A

NUMBER

tThis article is a part of a dissertation submitted to ithe Faculty of The University of
Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the xequirements for the S.J.D. degree.-Ed.
•Associate Professor of Law and University Counsel, Western Reserve University.-Ed.
1.Manfred Guttmacher and Henry Weihofen.
2-Durham v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 862.
3 BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw OF HOMICIDE (1955). Symposiums
on Law and Psychiatry may be found in 4 KAN. L. REv. 349 (1956); 45 KY. L.J. 215 (1957);
14 Omo ST. L.J. 117 (1953); and 29 TEMP. L.Q. 380 (1956).
4 Recent cases are collected in comment, 6 WEST. REs. L. iREv. 384 (1955).
5 Bailey v. Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W. (2d) 315 (1955), noted, 53
MICH. L. REv. 898 (1955). See also: LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §42.20 (1952),
and GUTIMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw, chapters 3 and 7 (1952).
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recognized that mental illness is the nation's number one public
health problem. In 1949, the last year for which reliable statistics
are available, 390,567 patients were admitted to mental hospitals. 6
Of these, 85 percent were admitted to public hospitals. At the
end of 1949, there were 663,115 patients listed on the books of
mental hospitals (either as resident patients or on conditional
release) and over 98 percent were accounted for by the state
hospitals.7 These patients occupy about one-half of all available
hospital beds. Despite recent developments in the use of the
tranquilizing drugs, the statistics are about the same today as
they were in 1949. 8
Mental illness wastes money as well as lives. The direct cost
of mental illness is borne almost entirely by the state governments,
as this is one of the few important state functions which receive
no federal grants-in-aid. The state hospital systems are one of
the "big four" with respect to total state expenses; these are
education, highways, social welfare, and mental hospitals, in that
order. Although every state requires patients in state hospitals
to pay for their care if able, less than ten percent of state hospital
maintenance costs are recovered from patients. The state governments spend approximately $600 million annually for capital
and operating costs of mental hospitals,9 and the annual wage
loss attributable to mental patients has been estimated at $1,750,000,000.10 One of the most important and least recognized indirect
costs of mental illness is the tremendous volume of industrial
accidents caused by mentally ill workers who are accident prone.
It has been estimated that ten percent of the labor force is responsible for 75 percent of the accidents, and that a substantial portion of these suffer from anxiety or hysteria neuroses.11

6 U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PATIENTS IN MENTAL !NSrITUTIONS-1949, p. 22, Pub.
No. 233 (1952).
7Ibid.
s This does not mean that the tranquilizers are ineffective. The total volume of
cases remains the same, but the period of hospitalization has been reduced and more
people are able to obtain psychiatric care because of the increased turnover. Silverstein,
"Psychology, Mental Illness, and the Law," 60 W. VA. L. REv. 55 at 61-63 (1957).
9COUNCIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES: 1954-55, p. 298 (1954);
COUNCIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTS, REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE-THE MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAMS OF THE FORTY-EIGHT STATES 107 (1950) [hereinafter cited REPORT TO
GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE]; U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, PUB. No. 233, Table 19 (1952).
10 NATIONAL AssoCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH, FAcrs AND FIGURES 3, 9 (1952).
11 James and Dickinson, "Accident Proneness and Accident Law," 63 HARV. L. REv.
769 (1950).
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A. Recent Developments in the Legal Aspects of Hospitalization
During the past ten years, legislatures throughout the country
have been concerned with the mentally ill and the role of the
state in their care and treatment. The critical nature of the
problem has been recognized by both Congress12 and the states.
At the state level this concern has resulted in a number of recent
substantial revisions of both the organizational structure of the
mental hospital systems and the commitment statutes.
There has been some disagreement as to the desirability of
uniform legislation among the states in respect to the hospitalization of the mentally ill. The American Bar Association Special
Committee on the Rights of the Mentally Ill concluded that the
subject of commitment does not lend itself with advantage to a
uniform state law, as few problems in the field are projected
beyond state boundaries.13 Other writers have not hesitated to
make detailed recommendations for uniform legislation.14 The
impact of commitment on legal capacity to sell or contract, which
affects interstate trade, the increased mobility of our population,
the increased incidence of multi-state property holding, and the
increased number of U.S. Veterans Administration patients, most
of whom are committed under state statutes, all indicate a greater
need for uniformity.
The most important stimulus to uniformity occurred in
June 1949 when the Governors' Conference asked the Council
of State Governments to prepare a detailed report on state
programs for the care of the mentally ill. The research report,
together with forty specific recommendations, was returned
to the Governors' Conference in June of 1950.15 At about the
same time, a working committee was formed in the Federal Security Agency, at the request of the National Advisory Mental
12 The National Mental Health Act was passed in 1946. 60 Stat. 421, 42 U.S.C. (1952)
§§201-246. The act authorized federal grants-in-aid to the states for research and education in the area of preventive mental health. No direct grants are made to the state
mental hospital system. Passage of the act has done much to arouse interest in mental
hygiene programs among the states and has resulted in a number of states revising the
administrative structure of the state mental hospitals. See REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS'
CONFERENCE 82.
13 73 A.B.A. 'REP. 287 (1948).
14 See, for example, the quite specific recommendations of the Medical Director of
the U.S. Public Health Service: KEMPF, LAws PERTAINING TO THE ADMISSION OF PATIENTS
TO MENTAL HOSPITALS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, U.S. Public Health Reports,
Supp. No. 157, p. 28 (1944).
15 REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE.
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Health Council, and was asked to draft a model commitment
act to implement the recommendations of the Governors' Report.
The work of the committee culminated in the transmittal in
September 1950 of a draft act to all of the state govemors.16 By
the end of 1957, ten states had adopted the Draft Act in whole
or in part.
·
The Draft Act was not designed as a uniform act, but it is
intended as an aid to states which are considering revision of
existing statutes. The President of the National Association for
Mental Health stated:
" ... nobody asserts that the Act is perfect or that all of its
provisions will satisfy the needs and circumstances of any
particular State. The Act is presented by the Federal Security
Agency as a working model, to be adapted to local need and
conditions and to be drawn upon for suggestions by those responsible for legislation in each of the States of the Union." 17
Unfortunately, the newest and most complete survey of the
legal aspects of mental illness has not yet been published. This
is the Project on the Rights of the Mentally Ill, one of the first
research surveys conducted by the recently established American
Bar Foundation. The study is comparative in nature and surveys the statutes, regulations, and cases in all of the states and
territories:
"The Foundation's survey of the law of mental illness is the
most comprehensive examination of this topic to be undertaken in this country or abroad, and encompasses all major
civil and criminal law areas relating to mental illness. The
special contribution of the Foundation project to mental
illness law may therefore be in the fact that it proposes to deal
with the whole area in an integrated manner. No such evaluation of the interrelationships among all phases of the law
has ever been attempted."18
While uniform legislation may be desirable, it is not essential.

16A DRAFr Acr GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY

!LL, U.S. PUBLIC

HEALTH SERVICE, PUBLICATION No. 51, rev. ed. (1952) [hereinafter :referred to as the Draft
Act]. A brief summary of the act, by one of its authors, is set forth in Felix, "Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," 107 AM. J. PsYClilATRY 712 (1951). Unless expressly stated
otherwise, all references in this article are to ithe 1952 revised edition of the Draft Act
rather than to the original 1951 edition. Both published editions include a commentary
by the draftsman of the act, hereinafter :referred to as "Author's Commentary."
11 Draft Act at vii (1951).
18 Kittrie, "Justice for the Mentally Ill," 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 46 at 48 (1957).
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What is important is that state legislatures understand the problems involved in compulsory commitment, recognize the complex
relationship that exists between the commitment statutes and
other legal aspects of mental illness, and take advantage of the
experience of those states which have recently adopted the Draft
Act or other comprehensive commitment statutes.19
B. Terminology
When a mental patient is "arrested" by a "sheriff" armed
with a "warrant," "charged" as a person "accused of insanity"
and after "trial" committed to an "institution" as an "inmate,"
it is not hard to see why the terminology used acts as an emotional
shock which may seriously hinder treatment and recovery. Most
of the states have modernized the terminology of commitment in
the past twenty years, although too many states retain a distinct
criminal flavor in their statutes.20
The modern statutory terminology varies from state to state.
In this paper language is used as follows:
(1) The term "mental illness" is used here and in most modern
statutes rather than the older terms "insanity," "lunacy" or "unsoundness of mind." "Mental illness" as used by psychiatrists refers generally to any type or degree of mental unbalance or personality disorder. Although "insanity" was formerly used to mean
any serious mental illness, it is now generally used to refer to the
degree of mental illness which excuses criminal responsibility.

19 For those states which contemplate revision of their statutes, one of the best
sources of information consists of the research repor,ts of some of the states which have
recently overhauled their •hospitalization statutes. One of the most valuable Teports is
that of the ll.LINOIS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COMMITMENT TO MENTAL HOSPITALS, Pub. No.
52 (1942). The recommendations of the Council were finally adopted as the Mental
Health Code of 1951, m. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91½, See also KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES IN ,KANSAS, Parts I and II, Pub. Nos. 143 and 145 (1946); MICHIGAN
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 13th Annual Report, Part II (1943), and 14th Annual Report, Part I
(1944); MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE REsEARCH COMMI'ITEE, CARE AND 'TREATMENT OF MENTAL
PATIENTS, Pub. No. 19 (1948); WISCONSIN JOINT INTERIM COMMI'ITEE ON REvlSION OF THE
PUBLIC WELFARE LAws, GENERAL COMMENT (1947)-published as a series of footnotes to
Wis. Stat. (1947) c. 51, and in Wis. Stat. Ann. (West, 1957). Foreign experience in dealing
with mental illness is also available. See the recently published report of the Royal
Commission on ,the Law relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, 1954-1957
(1957. H,M.S.O.), commented on in 21 Moo. L. ·REY. 63 (1958); and FOURTH REPORT oF THE
ExPERT COMMI'ITEE ON MENTAL HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Technical Reports
Series No. 98 (1955).
20 For discussions of terminology in commitment statutes, see REPORT TO GoVERNORS'
CONFERENCE 47; comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1181 (1947).
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"Incompetency" is used to refer to that degree of mental illness
which renders the individual unable to take care of his property
and justifies the appointment of a guardian. Unfortunately, there
is no term which refers to the degree of mental · illness which
justifies either voluntary or compulsory hospitalization. A few
writers have used "commitability" but the term seems clumsy
and has not gained acceptance. Partly because of this confusion
in terminology, and partly because human minds can not be
measured in pounds or feet, the states have had a great deal of
difficulty in defining the degree of mental illness which justifies
hospitalization.
Some states have used the term "mental illness" in the definition section of the statute in a general sense and in later provisions
attempted to spell out the degree of mental illness which is required to commit a person to a mental hospital. For example,
the Wisconsin statute provides: "51.001. Definitions. As used in
this chapter: (1). Mental illness is synonymous with insanity.... " 21
A later section provides that the patient must be both mentally ill
and "a proper subject for custody and treatment."22
The Draft Act also provides a general definition plus a more
detailed provision for the degree of illness which justifies hospitalization. The act provides:
"Section 1. Definitions.-As used in this Act, terms shall have
the following meanings:
(a) Mentally ill individual.-An individual having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs his mental health. " 23
A later provision states that compulsory hospitalization for
an indeterminant period can be ordered by a court if the court
finds that the proposed patient:
"(I) is mentally ill, and
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or others
if allowed to remain at liberty, or
(3) is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient insight
or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to
his hospitalization.
" 24
21 Wis. Stat. (1957)
22 Id., §51.02(5)(c).
23 Draft Act, §1.
24 Id., §9(g).

§51.001.
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On the other hand, some states define "mental illness" so as
to include the conditions which must be met before hospitalization is required. For example, New York and Pennsylvania define
the term as follows:
"§2. Definitions. When used in this chapter, unless otherwise
e~pressly ~tated, or unless the context or subject matter otherWISe requires, . . .
(8) A 'mentally ill person' means any person affiicted with
mental disease to such an extent that for his own welfare or
the welfare of others, or of the community, he requires care
and treatment. . . ." 211
"§1072. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the context
clearly indicates otherwise, the following words and phrases
shall have the following meanings: . . . (11) 'Mental illness'
shall mean an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person
to use his customary self-control, judgment and discretion in
the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it
necessary or advisable for him to be under care. The term
shall include 'insanity,' 'unsoundness of mind,' 'lunacy,' 'mental disease,' 'mental disorder,' and all other types of mental
cases, but the term shall not include 'mental deficiency,' 'epilepsy,' 'inebriety,' or 'senility,' unless mental illness is superimposed. " 26
None of the above definitions is really adequate and some have
"been severely criticized as vague and loosely worded.27 The phrase
"necessary or advisable" in the Pennsylvania statute above is an
obvious example of loose terminology. Does this almost universal
ambiguity of statutory language mean that we can't do any better?
'. Does it cast doubt on our ability to deal with the problem by
statute? It seems clear that the problem must be faced and that
the courts and hospital administrators should be entitled to both
expert opinion directed toward the individual case and to a statutory policy statement of the prerequisites for hospitalization. In
this connection it is worth noting that the Draft Act statement,
which seems to be the most precise of any of the above statutes,
has been criticized, but on policy grounds, rather than for am-

25S4A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1951) §2.
26 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 50, §1072.
27 See the criticism of the New York and !Draft Act provisions in Whitmore, "Comments on the Draft Act for the Hospitalization· of the Mentally Ill," 19 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 512 at 521 and notes 45-48 (1951). · , ·
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biguity or vagueness.28 However, for want of a better term, the
phrase "mental illness" will be used herein essentially as it appears
in the Draft Act, i.e., as indicating a general personality disorder
(Draft Act, section la) coupled with either the situation where
the patient is dangerous to himself or others, or with the situation
where the patient needs hospitalization and lacks sufficient mental
capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to hospitalization (Draft Act, section 9g). This paper does not deal with the
problems of commitment of mental defectives, formerly called
feeble-minded, or of alcoholics, or drug addicts. These groups
present separate although related policy issues.29
(2) The term "mental hospital" is used herein, rather than
"insane asylum." There are two kinds of mental hospitals. "Temporary-care hospitals" specialize in short-term diagnostic screening
and treatment and include general hospital mental facilities, psychiatric out-patient clinics, receiving hospitals, and psychopathic
hospitals. "Prolonged-care hospitals" include the "regular" state
hospitals and most private hospitals. Although such a hospital may
also handle diagnosis and short-term intensive treatment, a great
majority of patients are those who receive long-term treatment
and custodial care.
(3) "Patient" is used here and in most statutes rather than
the older term "inmate" which had undesirable criminal implications. The term is also used here and in most of the recent
statutes to describe a person against whom involuntary commitment proceedings have been instituted.
(4) "Conditional release" describes a situation where a patient
is carried on the books of the hospital but is not a resident. The
older statutes use the terms "parole" or "furlough" while more
recent statutes use "home care," "trial visit," "convalescent
leave," etc.
28Ibid.
29 The mental defective who needs institutional treatment is usually placed in a
special institution, called a school, rather than in a mental hospital. The program of
treatment is primarily custodial and educational, directed toward ·teaching the patient
to live within his limitations. The narcotic addict is also treated as a special case, partly
because of the close relation between addiction and the illegal drug traffic and partly
because -treatment in the regular mental hospitals has not been very successful. Most of
the severe cases are treated in the United States Public Health hospitals which specialize
in treatment and research in the narcotic field. There is a distinct trend toward treatment
of the alcoholic as a separate class. Hospital treatment is rarely effective, especially in
crowded state hospitals where ·the alcoholics are frequently housed along with other
patients. The answer seems to lie in the establishment of clinics at the local level which
treat alcoholics primarily on an outpatient basis.
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(5) "Commitment" refers to the procedures for compulsory
hospitalization. A few states use "involuntary hospitalization" or
"certification." The latter term is confusing, since in some states
voluntary patients must also be "certified" as in need of treatment
in order to allow public funds to be used for their care.
C. Types of Hospitalization Procedures
The problems involved in the admission of a patient to a
mental hospital are usually thought of in terms of formal commitment proceedings involving compulsory hospitalization for an
indefinite period. There are at least six separate types of admission
procedures.
I. Voluntary Admission. This involves a written request for
admission by a patient who is competent to make such a request.
A number of states also authorize the parent or guardian of a
minor to make the application. In most states, the patient may be
detained, either for a fixed period after admission (typically 60
days), or for a brief period after he requests release (typically
IO days).
2. Admission by Guardian. A number of states authorize the
guardian of an adjudicated incompetent to commit the ward to
a mental hospital, either with or without the consent of the court
which supervises the guardian. Although some statutes refer to
this as voluntary admission, it is compulsory as far as the patient
is concerned and should be treated separately as a form of
commitment.
3. Non-protested Admission. This procedure is sometimes referred to as "involuntary admission." Non-protested admission is
not the same as voluntary admission, since no affirmative action
is required of the patient, nor is it compulsory since a protest by
the patient is effective. A number of states authorize the hospital
to receive a patient who is presented for admission by a friend,
relative, or physician. If he protests at the time of admission, he
may not be received, and if he protests after admission, he must
be discharged within a short period, or compulsory proceedings
must be instituted.
4. Emergency Commitment. Almost every state has some authorization for compulsory commitment to a mental hospital in
emergency cases, where the patient may be dangerous to himself
or others and needs immediate care. The procedure is summary
and permits detention only for a short period.
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5. Temporary Commitment. This is the newest of the compulsory procedures and is primarily a device for diagnostic screening, although it is also used for short-term treatment. It developed
from the older emergency procedures, but is not based on the
existence of a clear emergency. The procedure is summary and
authorizes detention for a limited period.
6. Formal Commitment. This procedure is the one most commonly used and generally involves commitment for an indeterminate period after a full-dress judicial hearing in which the
prospective patient is given a chance to contest the need for
hospitalization.
The purpose of this paper is to survey existing statutes and
case law on formal, or indeterminate, commitment. In almost every
state the other procedures exist side by side with the formal procedure, and. many patients who are ultimately committed for an
indeterminate period are first admitted under one of the other
provisions. The relationship between these procedures has been
dealt with elsewhere.30

II.

THE THEORY OF COMPULSORY COMMITMENT

Mental illness, as such, like any other illness, is a medical
problem and is primarily of concern to the medical profession,
especially to the psychiatrist who specializes in the diagnosis and
treatment of mental illness, and to the clinical psychologist (not
an M.D.) who deals with diagnostic and testing procedures. One
of the principal characteristics of mental illness, or possibly even
a definition, is the failure of the individual to adapt to the society
of which he is a part. Whether the illness results from organic
causes, such as paresis, or is one of the diseases for which no
organic cause can be found, the symptoms of serious mental illness are essentially those of release, or regression to an uninhibited state. The social controls, including the individual's
ability to· work within a complex human relationship, are usually
the first to suffer deterioration. This failure may result in the
inability of the individual to care for himself, or it may be ex.•:.

30 Legal aspects of voluntary admissions are discussed in detail in my article, "Hospitalization of the Voluntary Mental Patient," 53 MICH. L. REv. 353 (1955). Procedures (2)
~o)-lgh (5) and their relation to formal commitment are discussed in Ross, "Hospitalli:ing :the Mentally Ill-Emergency and Temporary Commitments," printed in CURRENT.
TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1955-56, p. 461 (1957).
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pressed in antisocial conduct directed at others. In either case,
the problems are no longer medical, but have social and legal
consequences. Thus the law, which is the most specialized and
coercive of social controls, is used to regulate and channel the
by-products of mental illness. The principal policy questions in
the area of compulsory hospitalization are:
(1) What degree or type of social-adaptive failure should be
required to justify hospitalization against the wishes of the
individual?
(2) How can this standard be incorporated in legal procedures so that the policy reasons behind the standard will be
effectuated, and, at the same time, the individual will be protected against unwarranted deprivation of his liberty?
(3) What effect, if any, should compulsory hospitalization
have on the legal rights of the individual, other than his loss of
personal liberty? Should a committed person have the power to
appoint an agent, get a divorce, make a will, etc., or should
hospitalization automatically result in total loss of legal capacity?
This last question is discussed in Part IV.
A. The Legal Justification for Commitment
A careful reading of the four statutory definitions of mental
illness set forth in a preceding section31 indicates that whatever
agreement exists as to the purpose of the commitment laws, a
consensus can not be found in the statutes. Just when is a patient
a "proper subject for care and treatment" under the Wisconsin
statute? Under many of the statutes it is not clear whether the
commitment process is primarily protective, custodial, or
therapeutic.
I. The Police Power. The clearest justification for compulsory commitment comes from the power of the state to protect
itself against breaches of the peace. The police power is ". . . one
of the most essential of powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least !imitable of the powers of government."32 A
31Notes 21-26 supra. The statutory provisions of all of the states are listed in Tables
1 and 3 of Appendix I infra. Of the 43 states which utilize judicial commitment procedures, 4 predicate commitment on danger to society, 5 on the fact that the patient needs
treatment and will ,benefit from it, 28 states and tlle Draft Act allow either criteria, and
in 6 states the statutes are silent on the subject. Of the 14 states using ex parte commitment, 3 and the Draft Act use danger, 1 need of treatment, 5 either ground, and not
stated in 5.
32District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 1!18 at 149 (1909).
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person who is not mentally ill can be incarcerated for life if he
is guilty of violence against persons or property, and the imprisonment is used both as retribution and to protect society from
future violence. Can the same person be imprisoned indefinitely
in order to protect society where he has not yet been guilty of a
crime, but will probably commit a crime in the future? The
decisions on the constitutionality of the "sexual psychopath" laws
indicate an affirmative answer. While some of these statutes, such
as that of Ohio, apply only to persons convicted of crime, some
states do not require prior criminal conduct as a prerequisite to
indeterminate imprisonment. Thus a Minnesota statute which
allowed indefinite incarceration for a person adjudged a "psychopathic personality" was upheld by the Supreme Court, where
the statute defined a "psychopath" as a person "irresponsible for
his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous
to other persons."33 The court said that the element of danger
is a fact which calls for proof of past (non-criminal) conduct
pointing to probable future consequences, and is as susceptible of
proof as many criteria constantly applied in criminal
prosecutions.34
The Draft Act states that a person can be committed when
he is mentally ill and because of his illness is "likely to injure ...
others if allowed to remain at liberty." 35 Many commitment
statutes contain similar language. Since the purpose of such a
statute is the protection of society rather than retribution, the
constitutional protections afforded in criminal prosecutions are
not required. There is one obvious constitutional limitation, the
requirement of an indeterminate sentence. Since the only justification for depriving such a person of his liberty is that he is
dangerous to society, the restraint can last only as long as the
danger exists. Presumably, commitment for a fixed term would
be unconstitutional.
2. The State as Parens Patriae. The other major source of
state authority over the mentally ill is the position of the state as
parens patriae. Under this doctrine the sovereign has both the
right and the duty to protect the persons and property of those
who are unable to care themselves because of minority or mental
33 Minnesota v. Probate
34 Id. at 274.
35 Draft Act, §9(g).

Court, 309 U.S. 270 at 272 (1940).
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illness. In England, the guardianship of those under legal disability was originally intrusted to the feudal lords, but was taken
over by the Crown in the 13th century and delegated to the Lord
Chancellor. In this country, the royal prerogative was inherited
by the individual states and has been held to constitute part of
the original inherent jurisdiction of the equity courts.86 The
doctrine of parens patriae has been the primary source of the law
of guardianship87 and the juvenile courts laws38 and is clearly
reflected in many commitment statutes. Probably the clearest
example of the parens patricte concept is the Draft Act section
which provides as an alternative ground for compulsory commitment that the patient "is in need of custody, care or treatment
in a· mental hospital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to
hospitalization."39 Another part of the same section authorizes
commitment where the patient is likely to injure himself if allowed
to remain at large.
The gradual extension of the parens patriae concept to compulsory commitment raises a number of difficult policy questions
which can be illustrated by the case of John S:
John S. is an elderly man, living alone on a small farm. His
intellectual capacities are adequate to make a marginal living,
care for his farm and get along with his neighbors. The only
difficulty is that he is subject to fits of severe depression, lasting
for several months. A competent psychiatrist estimates that there
is a two-to-one chance that if left unrestrained he will commit
suicide within the next year or two during a depressed state. John
recognizes his illness as an intermittent manic-depressive psychosis, but prefers to remain on his farm and run the risk of selfdestruction. Should this man, who is clearly not a danger to anyone except himself, be hospitalized against his wishes? Is this
the kind of choice that should be made by the state, or should it
be left to the individual?
I suspect that if this case were put to a representative group of
lawyers, there would be considerable disagreement, both as to
the "correct" answer and as to the additional factors to be con864 POMEROY, EQ. JUR., 5th ed., §§1303-1314 (1941).
87 MADDEN, DOMES'rIC RELATIONS §151 (1931).
881n re T-urner, 94 Kan. ll5, 145 P. 871 (1915).
89 Draft Act, §9(g).
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sidered. The language of most commitment statutes is broad
enough to allow a decision either way. Some would argue that
the sanctity of human life is an absolute (except in wartime) and
the state has a duty to preserve the life of its subjects. Analogous
principles could be used from the law of guardianship and from
the statutes which make attempted suicide a crime. Others would
argue that the law should not be concerned with social non-conformity, and that everyone has a right "to go to Hell in his own
way." There are other factors which may or may not be important.
Should the commitment court consider the estimated cost of
psychiatric care, both to the patient and to the taxpayers? Should
the probability and duration of successful treatment affect the
decision? Should a guardian of the property be appointed, and,
if so, how can the decisions of the court which appoints the
guardian be correlated with the court which is responsible for
the commitment decision? In many states these are two different
courts.
The justification which has been advanced for commitment
of the "harmless" patient (in the sense of harmless to others) is
essentially the same as the justification for guardianship. Where
a patient does not have the mental capacity to make a sound
decision relative to his own hospitalization, the state will step in
and make it for him, even though the same individual does have
capacity to make a will or a contract. This is an example of
"partial incompetency."
The authors of the Draft Act have stated:
"Within the wide range of mental illnesses there are cases
in which the sick individual, like the individual who is physically sick, retains sufficient capacity to make a responsible
decision on the question of his hospitalization, weighing it
against other factors in his life and affairs. On the other
hand, without being 'dangerous,' a mentally ill individual
may, because of the nature or stage of his illness, lose his
power to make choices or become so confused as no longer
to have the capacity to make a decision having any relation to
the factors bearing on his hospitalization. It is in the latter
situation that the Act permits compulsory hospitalization.
"The mentally ill individual who is found to have retained
this capacity cannot be compelled to enter a hospital unless
he is 'dangerous.'
"It should be emphasized that it is not a question of the individual agreeing or disagreeing with medical judgment as to
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the nature of his illness or the need for hospital care, but
rather of whether he is capable of making a responsible, not
necessarily a wise, decision in the premises.
"In short, the State through its courts is here authorized to
make for the individual a decision, which, by reason of his
illn•ess, he is incapable of making for himself." 40
Guttmacher and Weihofen have endorsed the Draft Act provision, 41 but several writers from both the legal and medical professions have expressed dissent. 42 Probably the strongest criticism
that has been expressed is found in an article by Dr. Charles
Whitmore.43 Dr. Whitmore states that the second ground for
compulsory hospitalization (that the patient needs care and because
of his illness is unable to make a responsible decision with respect
to hospitalization) is a radical departure from existing law and
is an unsound policy decision. He argues that this provision would
allow the compulsory detention of groups which have not been
hospitalized in the past, such as the severe psychoneurotic. Dr.
Whitmore's position seems to be overstated. The psychoneurotic
is rarely benefited by hospital treatment. The few extremely
severe cases would be hospitalized under the first ground stated
in the Draft Act, i.e., that they are dangerous to others. Very
rarely could a psychoneurotic be hospitalized under the second
ground. In almost all cases the psychoneurotic recognizes his
condition and is able to make a responsible decision relative to
hospitalization. However, there is a large group of prospective
patients who are not yet dangerous to themselves or others, who
are not mentally able to realize their condition or make responsible decisions, but who need hospitalization before their condition
deteriorates, as it may without treatment. This group consists
of the early stage manic-depressives and schizophrenics. It is for
this group of psychotic patients that the second ground for hospitalization in the Draft Act has been designed.
While the weight of both expert and legislative authority
favors retention of the second ground for hospitalization, it should
be understood that it is not an easy test to administer. The Draft
40 Draft Act, , Commentary,
41 PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW

p. 28.
311-312 (1952).
42 Curran, "Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," 31 N.C. L. REv. 274 at 291 (1953).
Cf. Szasz, "Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law," 58 CoL. L. REv. 183 at 197 (1958).
43 "Comments on a Draft Act for the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," 19 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 512 at 522 (1951).
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Act test refers to the capacity of the individual to make a rational
choice, not the wisdom of the choice. But isn't an unwise choice
evidence of incapacity? Specifically, if all the experts agree that
the benefits of hospitalization for a particular individual outweigh
the disadvantages (loss of personal liberty), does not the patient's
failure to heed the voice of authority give rise to a strong presumption that he is incapable of making a rational choice, or is it
merely evidence of non-conformity? Unfortunately, no statute can
by its terms indicate just where non-conformity ends and incapacity begins.
B. Commitment and the Decision Making Process
One of the most fruitful ways to consider mixed issues of
law and fact, such as commitment, is to consider the problem as
essentially one of judicial administration, i.e., who decides the
question and what kind of guides is the decision maker given.44
The illustration given in the preceding section Qohn S.) illustrates some important points which go to the heart of the commitment process.
1. The decision on commitment may have to be correlated
with the decision on guardianship. Should both of these functions
be lodged in the same court? Clearly the trend in judicial administration furnishes an affirmative answer. The end result of this
trend would be to set up a separate court to handle all matters of
personal status, or to bring under one court all areas which require specialized social service assistance furnished within the
court structure.45 Thus, in some jurisdictions, guardianship,
adoption, domestic relations, and juvenile problems are handled
by a single court, and in a very few jurisdictions, commitment
cases are handled by the same court.46
2. The generally accepted modern view of commitment is
that it is essentially a medical problem. Under the influence of
this concept, most commitment statutes provide for examination

44A recent example of this type of thinking can be found in Pfeifer v. Standard
Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 iN.W. (2d) 29 (1952). The court held that in a negligence case, the issue of factual cause should be put to the jury, unincumbered by concepts
of foreseeability, and in those few cases where liability ought to be limited to foreseeable
(or proximate) consequences, this is a decision for the court after verdict.
45 VmTUE, FAMILY CAsEs IN COURT, chapters 1, 10 and 11 (1956).
46 °TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT OF THE
OF NEW YORK 13 (1956).
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and report by a panel of two physicians appointed by the court.
There has been a strong trend toward reliance on court-appointed
experts who make the decision with very little control by the
court. The same trend is observable in the criminal law where
insanity is used as a defense.
There are two defects in the concept that commitment is an
essentially medical judgment. In the first place, exclusive reliance
upon the psychiatrist or physician arises in part from _!:he assumption that the diagnostic aspect of psychiatry is a branch of medicine. Psychiatry is primarily an art rather than a science. When an
individual is unable to adjust to society, the psychiatrist is able
to formulate a theory of causation which, because of his experience and training, is more sophisticated than that of a layman. In the same sense, the sociologist can usually work out a more
reliable theory on the causes of aberrant group behavior than can
a banker, although possibly the sociologist will run second to the
politician. The point is that mental illness is not a fact in the
same sense that a broken leg is; it is a theory used to explain
deviant behavior.47
Secondly, the psychiatrist, who is trained both in medicine
and in mental illness, is not necessarily the person most qualified
to decide on commitments. Recall the case of John S. The "facts,"
meaning expert theories, guesses, and estimates of future conduct,
were given as part of the problem, and are not controverted. But
agreement on facts does not dispose of the issue of compulsory
commitment. Commitment depends on social value judgments.
In the John S. case, any decision will draw a line between the
conflicting policies of individual liberty and state sanctions against
self-destruction. Clearly this is not a medical or even a psychiatric
judgment.48
A recent article by a psychiatrist points out:
"The fact that court approval is usually granted routinely
on the basis of medical testimony regarding the alleged need
for commitment signifies that by so acting physicians fulfill a
47 A recent article by a psychiatrist •points out that the analogy between medicine
and psychiatry is dangerously misleading (dangerous to both the law and to psychiatry).
See Szasz, "Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law," 58 CoL. L. REv. 183 at 187-192
(1958).
48 One of the few articles by a member of the legal profession which recognizes this
problem is Dession, "Deviation and Community Sanctions," published in PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW, edited by HOCH and ZUBIN (1955).
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special social role, unrelated to their technical knowledge.
Accordingly, by entering into this legal situation, the physician (psychiatrist) acts in the role of one of s0ciety's agents
whose duty it is to enforce compliance with certain social
rules .... [T]his may be an entirely 'legitimate' and morally
defensible role, similar to the roles, for example, of policeman
and judge. It is, however, scientifically misleading to equate
this role with that of an 'individual therapist' vis-a-vis the
patient .... If court action is to be determined this way, then
why not conclude that the psychiatrist has nothing to contribute to the proceedings? Judge and jury are by the very
definition of our democratic society the official experts in deciding which modes of behavior are socially unacceptable."49
It might be argued that the above contention is valid only
where the ground for commitment is based on parens patriae, but
not where it is based on the police power, since danger to society
is both a concept which finds greater agreement as a ground, and
is also more closely related to a psychiatric prediction of the
future course of the illness. This distinction is unsound. The
real question is not whether the individual is dangerous to society,
but how dangerous to whom, and what degree of danger can
society tolerate. Certainly the latter question is essentially a policy
issue. A truck driver with a mild neurosis who is "accident
prone" is probably a greater danger to society than most psychotics; yet he will not be committed for treatment, even if he
would be benefited. The answer lies in shifting him to a nondriving job, and the decision will probably be made by the employer rather than the psychiatrist. Even if the danger can not
be alleviated, the community expects a certain amount of dangerous activity. I suspect that as a class drinking drivers are a
greater danger than the mentally ill, and yet the drivers are
tolerated, or punished with small fines rather than indeterminate
imprisonment. Maybe our treatment of the drunken driver is not
the best choice, but the point is that it is a social choice rather
than a medical issue.
Once it is recognized that the medical witness, in a commitment proceeding, is acting as one of "society's agents" in determin-

49 Szasz, HCommitment of the Mentally ru: 'Treatment' or Social Restraint?" 125 J.
AND MENTAL DISEASE 293 (1957). 'I1his article contains ·the most complete summary of psychiatric literature on the role of the psychiatrist in legal proceedings.
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ing an essentially sociological question, several conclusions important to judicial administration can be drawn.
a. If impartial experts are to be used, there seems to be no
reason why the panel should be limited to physicians, or even
to psychiatrists. The social case worker, sociologist, or clinical
psychologist knows as much about social values as the doctor of
medicine, if not more.
b. In order to emphasize to the participants in the decision
making process that the questions are essentially social, the
statutes defining mental illness should be phrased in non-psychiatric terms 50 and the expert witnesses should be required to testify
in terms of social facts and predictions rather than in psychiatric
terms. Specifically, the expert should not be asked "Is this man
psychotic" or "Is he a proper subject for commitment." The
questions should be phrased as follows: What is the probability
that this man will behave in such and such a manner in the
future, specifying the sorts of situations which involve danger to
himself or others? What is the possibility that such situations will
occur? What is the probability of a successful cure? How long
will it take?
c. While only one state still requires a mandatory jury trial,
about half the states allow a jury trial on request of the patient.
As a policy matter, most authorities are opposed to the use of
the optional jury on the ground that the jury is not competent
to determine the medical issues involved. Thus one author has
stated that the use of a jury "is about as sensible as calling in the
neighbors to diagnose meningitis or scarlet fever." 151 If the decision
is based on sociological values, the cross-section of the community
may be the best agent, not to diagnose mental illness, but to apply
the diagnosis of the experts to the social context in which the
patient exists. A recent Wisconsin statute explicitly recognizes
the policy-making function of the optional jury by requiring a
special verdict. The jury is asked two questions: Is the patient
mentally ill? If so, should he be committed?52

150 Psychiatrists discourage the use of teohnical terms in ,the statutes, as the classification of mental illness is still in a state of flux. Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry
(Report No. 9, Committee on Forensic Psychiatry) p. I (1949).
51 STERN, MENTAL ILLNESS: A GUIDE FOR THE FAMILY 37 (1942). For other criticisms
of the optional jury, see Draft Act, Commentary, p. 26; GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 299 (1952); comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1192 (1947).
52Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.03.
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d. The points listed above are arguments in favor of limiting
the role of the medical witness to the presentation of expert opinion, with decision on the policy issues being left to a judge or
jury, and the purpose of this limitation is to further the decision
process. There is an additional purpose to be served by such a
limitation-the encouragement of effective psychotherapy. Reliance on the psychiatrist to make the commitment decision has two
adverse effects on the psychiatrist-it damages him psychologically,
and damages his future effectiveness as a healer. As to the first
point, the psychiatrist is trained to identify with his patient. He
is therapy-oriented and trained to think of his prime obligation
as that to his patient. When he is making a commitment decision,
he is forced to identify with the community, a conflicting role
which may cause trouble. One psychiatrist has indicated that there
is a widespread reluctance in the psychiatric profession to enter
into the commitment process, and suggests that this role-conflict
may be part of the cause.53 Secondly, the practice in a few states is
to allow commitment by the superintendent or staff physician of
the same state hospital to which the patient will be committed. In
other states, the patient whose indefinite commitment is being
sought may already be in the hospital as a voluntary patient or
under an emergency order, and the doctor who has been treating
him is called on to participate in the commitment process. This
practice should be avoided. Not only does placing the duties of
"prosecutor and judge" on the hospital staff lead to public criticism, but more important, it breaks down the vital relation of trust
and confidence between the patient and his therapist. One of the
most difficult problems faced by the psychiatrist in treatment is
persuading the patient to think for himself, a problem which is
rendered more difficult if the same therapist is "the law" to the
patient, with final authority to commit and discharge.54

III. COMMITMENT PROCEDURES
Proceedings for the compulsory commitment of a patient to
a mental hospital must not violate the constitutional provisions
that no person may be deprived of his liberty without due process
53 Szasz, "Commitment of the Mentally Ill: 'Treatment' or Social Restraint?" 125 J.
Nmvous AND MENTAL DISEASE 293 at 305 (1957). See also Dession, "Deviation and Community Sanctions," in HoCH AND ZUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 10 (1955).
54Szasz, "Psychiatry, Ethics, and ,the Criminal Law,'' 58 CoL. L. REv. 183 at 198 (1958);
comment, 56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1200, n. 106 (1947).
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of law. However, what may be needed to satisfy the constitutional
requirements may vary with the circumstances, and nowhere is
this principle more aptly illustrated than in the conflicting decisions on due process in commitment cases.
The precise requirements of due process are hard to state in
any area of the law, and especially so in the field of commitments
for the following reasons:
(I) A glance at the statutes discussed in this article reveals a
wide variety of enactments, many of them loosely worded. The
procedural aspects of commitment are the subject of continuous
legislative experimentation and there is a bewildering array of
commitment methods. As a result many judicial decisions have
turned on narrow questions of statutory interpretation and there
are few reported judicial decisions in which the result rested on
constitutional issues. Many of these procedures have remained
on the statute books for years with little or no constitutional
litigation.
(2) An additional factor which creates uncertainty in the constitutional area is the fact that many of the decisions which are
reported are relatively old. Since they were rendered, there have
been substantial changes in both psychiatric and legal understanding of the problems of mental illness. It is by no means certain
that a modern court would adhere without qualification to the
views expressed during the latter half of the nineteenth century.
This basic disagreement as to the minimum constitutional requirements has led to a bewildering variety of procedures. An
additional factor which has produced the same result is disagreement as to the feasibility of procedural safeguards over and above
those imposed by the constitution. The legal profession has emphasized the need to guard against "railroading" by the use of
procedures adopted from criminal or civil trials. A fair hearing
on notice, the right to counsel, and the right to a jury trial are not
mere "technicalities," but represent principles of justice in dealing
with human rights which have evolved over the centuries.
"The terms 'star chamber' and lettre de cachet describe no
imaginary evils dreamed up by cautious lawyers, but very
real practices current not so many hundreds of years ago, and
hardly exceeded in arbitrariness, tyranny and injustice by
practices rampant in Germany and elsewhere in our own
times.
"Safeguards designed to guarantee fair procedure and
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to prevent the abuse of commitment laws ... are therefore not
mere technicalities and formalities to be lightly brushed aside
in favor of some summary commitment procedure." 55
The reported cases indicate that occasional abuses do crop up,
and they are abuses which could be prevented by a rigid adherence
to traditional legal procedures. 56
On the other hand, it is clear that legal formalities may do
positive harm to the mental patient. A person who is already
mentally disturbed should not be forced to sit through a public
hearing and listen to his family and physician testify to his infirmities. The president of the American Psychiatric Association had
this to say on commitment procedures:
"Not long ago in California a wife decided that her husband
was mentally sick. He was depressed and had delusions that
persons were trying to kill him. Following the regular legal
procedure she swore out a warrant, the sheriff arrested the
patient, and he was taken to the county jail, there to await a
hearing before the judge. That night he hanged himself in
the jail. To those sticklers for legal procedure and defense
qf the legal rights of the patient, I would point out that his
legal rights were well preserved. He was arrested on a warrant
by a sheriff; he was not sent to a hospital without due process
of law and a chance to appear before the judge. Perhaps if
he had, he might be alive today. The point I wish to make
is that the public is so obsessed with the legal point of view
and the alleged infallibility of legal procedure that they insist on protecting the so-called legal rights of the patient without th~nking of what his medical rights are." 57
The defects in the ordinary forms of judicial procedure when
applied to the determination of mental illness are now widely
recognized. Fortunately, many states have attempted to devise
procedures which would protect the sane and provide minimum
interference with the treatment process.
Although procedures vary widely, two basic methods predominate. The most common, referred to as "judicial commitment," involves a hearing before a court or a quasi-judicial ad-

55 Weihofen and Overholser, "Commit!!Ilent of the Mentally Ill," 24 TEX. L. R.Ev.
307 at 337 (1946).
56For a good example of a "railroading'' case, see Shields v. Shields, (W.D. Mo.
1939) 26 F. Supp. 211.
57Bowman, Presidential Address, 103 .AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1 at 12 (1946).
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ministrative body. Ex parte commitment, used in fourteen states,
permits indeterminate commitment without a hearing. The commitment order is issued by a physician, public health officer or
judge, and a hearing is held only if the patient appeals the order.
The specific procedures for both methods and the statutory
references for the 49 states are set forth in Tables I to 4 of Appendix I infra, and the text of the judicial commitment section of the
Draft Act is reprinted in Appendix II. Particular aspects of commitment procedure have been discussed in detail elsewhere.58 The
purpose of this section is to summarize the existing statutes and
to identify the major problems and the recent trends in commitment procedure.

A. Judicial Commitment
I. Pre-hearing Procedures. In all of the 43 states which utilize
judicial commitment the action is initiated by a pleading, often
called an application, petition or complaint, which usually must
be verified. In most states any person can make such an application. In a few states the right to initiate proceedings is limited to
certain select groups, such as the guardian of the patient, a
physician or public official. Presumably, the reason for limiting
the applicant to members of a specified class is the same reason
for the requirement of verification: to discourage the groundless application.
A more effective method of preventing unnecessary proceedings is the requirement that a physician's report accompany the
application. The report, made after a personal examination, serves
another purpose: the provision for medical evidence at the hearing. In 34 states the statute requires that the court order a medical
examination by one or more doctors appointed by the court. With
the exceptions of Alaska, Kansas, and Rhode Island, all states require either one of these procedure,s, thus insuring that some medical evidence is available for the court. It is surprising that even
three states would permit commitment without any medical
examination.
58 On procedural due process generally, see the sections on the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments in CORWIN, CONsrrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES .ANNOTATED (1953). On jury
trials in commitment proceedings, see Williams, "Public-Law Adjudications of Mental
Unsoundness and Commitability in Texas: Jury Trial Policy," 1 BAYLOR L. R.Ev. 248
(1949). On notice, hearings and evidence, see the references cited in note 19 supra; and
articles in 24 TEX. L. REv. 307 (1946); 13 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 99 (1941); 3 STAN. L. REv.
109 (1950).
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Some states, and the Draft Act, require both medical examinations. This duplication seems to be unnecessary in light of the fact
that approximately 90 percent of commitments are uncontested.
Probably the best procedure would be to require a medical certificate with the application in all cases and require a separate examination only in those cases which are contested by the patient.
Generally, the pre-hearing examination is conducted by physicians, or, if they are available, psychiatrists. Minnesota has an interesting and worthwhile provision, which is one of the few statutory recognitions that the need for commitment is both a medical
and a social issue. The Minnesota court may appoint a social
worker or welfare agency to conduct a social case work investigation. Oklahoma also has an interesting innovation and one which
appears desirable. A pre-hearing examination is held by two
doctors and one attorney. The physicians advise the court on the
extent of mental illness and the attorney advises the court on the
need for concurrent guardianship proceedings.59
2. Notice of the· Hearing. Most statutes are deficient with respect to a major part of the hearing process-the provision for adequate and timely notice. Tp.e function of the notice is to provide
an opportunity for the patient who wishes to contest the commitment at th~ hearing the chance to prepare for the hearing. Measured by this standard, most of the statutes are defective in one or
more of the following respects:
(a) In many states the notice is served only two or three days
prior to the hearing. This short period is not adequate for a contested hearing and is probably utilized because the statutes were
drawn up when commitment was used mainly for dangerous patients who were held in jail pending a hearing. Today there is no
necessity for a quick hearing, since many patients can be treated
on an out-patient basis while waiting for a hearing, and the dangerous patient can be hospitalized pending the hearing under one
of the emergency admission procedures.
(b) Ideally, the notice should do more than inform the patient
of the time and place of the hearing. Too many statutes set forth a
notice form phrased in complex legal terms. The notice specified
by the recent Texas Mental Health Act is a model of simplicity
and completeness. In laymen's language it tells the patient what

59 Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §54.
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the hearing issues will be and advises him of his right to a jury
trial, his right to counsel, and how these rights can be exercised.60
(c) Many of these statutes require notice to the patient, but do
not provide for any notice to others who may be interested in his
commitment. A carefully drawn statute, such as the Draft Act,
would also require notice to a guardian, if any has previously
been appointed, to the spouse, and to close relatives. These persons
should be notified, if their location is known, even though they
are outside of the state.
(d) Most states wisely provide that if the medical examiners
certify that notice to the patient would be harmful, the court can
omit personal notice. However, few states provide an adequate
substitute for personal notice when it has been omitted. The
Washington statute is the only one which is really adequate in this
respect. Notice to the patient can be dispensed with for medical
reasons only when the notice is served on a court-appointed guardian ad litem who must be an attorney.
3. The Hearing. The hearing is customarily held in either the
probate court or in the general trial court, although in seven states
the hearing is held by a specialized quasi-judicial agency with judicial powers. The hearing is mandatory, except that four states provide that the hearing will be held only if the patient requests it.
In the uncontested case, the commitment decision is made on the
written record which consists of the petition and the medical
report. At first glance the optional hearing procedure seems desirable, since most commitments are uncontested and the provision
for a hearing only when requested does result in a substantial
saving of time and effort. However, there are too many important
auxiliary decisions for the hearing to be dispensed with. Specifically, the hearing ought to reveal the need for a legal guardianship,
which is a decision which can not be made on the record alone. In
three of the four states which do not hold hearings in all cases, the
commitment order does not result in automatic incompetency. In
the uncontested case the patient is hospitalized, legally capable of
executing deeds and contracts, and no consideration is given to the
need for protection of his estate from his own improvident acts.
In a state such as New York where commitment does result in
incompetency, the patient may be placed in the anomalous posi-

60Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-44.
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tion of being denied legal capacity, and yet having no substitute
appointed to protect his estate from dissipation. Also, in many
states, the question of the liability of the patient's estate and his
relatives for the expenses of hospital care is made at the time of
commitment, which, of course, requires a hearing in almost every
case.
4. Jury Trial. The obvious disadvantages of the mandatory
jury trial have been recognized by all of the authorities, and today
only Kentucky and Alaska require a jury in every case.61 The majority of states have completely dispensed with the jury system,
although in 13 states it is available in contested cases where requested by the patient. Personal observation indicates that the
jury trial is rarely used where it is available, mainly because the
patient is rarely informed of its availability. Most medical authorities state that the optional jury trial is unnecessary to protect the
sane and is undesirable because a jury can be fooled by a paranoiac
who can be lucid and convincing during the trial. The answer to
both of these points lies in better presentation of the medical
evidence, and neither objection seems a valid indictment of the
jury system per se. As previously indicated in Part II (B), the question of commitment is often more of a social problem than strictly
medical, indicating that the jury trial may be worthwhile. Probably
the best system would be to permit a jury trial where the patient or
his guardian ad litem specifically request it but to require that a
special verdict be used, as is done in Texas and Wisconsin.62
5. Th'e Informal Nature of the Hearing. It is widely recognized
that when the formal hearing is conducted in public with the
patient compelled to be present the cumulative effect of the whole
procedure is often medically harmful. The paranoiac is already
suffering from the feeling that society is conspiring to punish him.
If he is required to sit in a courtroom and listen to his physician
and family testify against him, the experience will confirm his
suspicions and make psychiatric treatment much more difficult.
61 Several authors have recently stated that no
GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW

state today requires a jury. See
(1952) at 300. The only exception
listed is Texas, which amended its Constitution in 1953 to permit waiver of a jury.
Apparently, in reading the Kentucky statute, ithe authors have been misled by the section
title "Jury Trial may be had unless waived.'' The body of the statute requires a jury in
every case. Ky. Rev. Stat. §202.080. Section titles are not part of the law in Kentucky
(§446.140) and ,the attorney general ·has ruled that ·the jury is mandatory. Ky. Op. Atty.
Gen. 39, 583 (1957).
62 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-51; Wis Stat. (1957) §51.03.
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Most commitment statutes, either expressly or by implication, no
longer require the physical presence of the patient. A number of
states also provide that the court may exclude all persons who do
not have a legitimate interest in the hearing, and permit the court
to hold the hearing at any place, including the home of the patient
or a medical facility. The Draft Act expressly provides for all of
the above, and, in addition, provides that the court is not bound by
the technical rules of evidence, but can admit any relevant evidence
for whatever weight it has. This last provision is very common in
juvenile court and workmen's compensation acts, but as yet is not
common in commitment statutes.
All of these provisions a,re desirable and permit considerable
variation between the degrees of formality required for contested
and uncontested hearings. The major defect is that in most states
there is no requirement that the patient be informed of his rights
to be present or to require a formal hearing in open court. The
recent Texas Act is a major improvement over many statutes in
this respect. The statutory notice spells out in simple language the
right to have a jury, an attorney, and the right to be present.63
6. Representation by Counsel. As indicated in Appendix I,
twenty-five states now expressly provide that the patient can be
represented by counsel and nineteen require that the court must
appoint counsel if the patient requests it. The primary purpose of
allowing counsel to a patient is, of course, to insure that the patient
has a real chance to contest the case. Many of the statutes on courtappointed counsel are defective in one or more of the following
aspects: (1) In most states, appointed counsel is either not compensated at all, or a low fee is set by the statute. The result is that
counsel is not encouraged to prepare adequately for the hearing.
(2) In some states counsel is appointed on the day of the hearing.
The aid of counsel tends to become a mere formality unless the
attorney is appointed early enough so that he can consult with his
client and gather the evidence. (3) Most of the states which do
provide for appointed counsel do so only on request of the patient,
and yet there is no provision requiring that the patient be informed of his right to counsel.
Since the traditional role of counsel has been thought of in
terms of the prevention of "railroading" by designing relatives,
the statutes of most of the states contemplate participation by
63 Note

60 supra.
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counsel only in the contested cases. There are other functions
which can and should be served by counsel in all cases of long term
hospitalization, whether the case is contested or not. In some jurisdictions the court can commit the patient without loss of legal
capacity, or can commit as incompetent. Where this choice is possible, counsel should assist the court in reaching a desirable decision. Furthermore, in many states there is no choice and every
long term commitment order automatically results in legal incompetency, but no provision is made for the automatic appointment
of a guardian. The patient is thus left in the peculiar position of
being deprived of the right to deal with his property and having
no responsible person appointed to substitute for him. In such a
case the appointed counsel can be of great help by investigating
the need for a separate guardianship action.

B. Ex Parte Commitment
Short-term commitment, without any hearing, is available in
almost all of the states, either where the patient is dangerous and
must be restrained until the formal proceedings can take place, or
where the patient is committed for observation and diagnosis
pending a formal hearing. 64 In fourteen states, the procedure .is
available for indeterminate commitment, and in six states it is the
only available procedure. The typical statute permits compulsory
hospitalization on the certificate of two physicians who must make
a personal examination. In several of the states the commitment
order is approved by a judge, but the function of the judge is
limited to determining whether the papers are in order. In a few
states the committing doctors must report the fact of commitment
to the relatives of the patient and to the state mental health agency.
I. The Policy Basis of Ex Parte Commitment. The justification for ex parte commitment is that most cases are uncontested,
and it is inconvenient and costly to require a hearing in every
case. In the few cases where the patient wishes to contest the
commitment order, an appeal is available, either by a statutory
appeal from the commitment order with a trial de novo, or by
means of an independent habeas corpus action. Since the procedure is not based on the existence of an emergency or dangerous
64 Emergency and ,temporary observation commitment on an ex parte •basis is discussed in Ross, "Hospitalizing tbe Mentally Ill-Emergency and Temporary Commitments," in CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 1955-56, P· 401 (1957).
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situation and is not subject to any initial public control, substantial constitutional issues are raised. These will be discussed in
the next section. For the same reasons, there is a greater possibility of abuse of the procedure. In order to prevent possible
misuse of the process, most of the statutes include one or more
of the following safeguards:
(I) The admission formalities are greater than in the case
of emergency or short term observation commitment. Instead of
allowing commitment on the certificate of one physician, as is
common in the emergency case, the approval of two or more
physicians, or of a designated public official, such as a health
officer or coroner, is required.
(2) In several states, the ex parte procedure is available only
for use by the state hospital system. The state hospitals, usually
overcrowded and understaffed, retain a veto power over the
commitment decision and are not likely to accept a borderline
case.
The decision on whether or not ex parte commitment is
wise is not easy to make. There are arguments in favor of the
procedure:
(I) The average layman thinks of a criminal trial when he
thinks about law. A hearing before a black-robed judge, with
lawyers, witnesses, bailiffs, and all the other trappings of a formal
trial, is very apt to be confused with a criminal prosecution,
especially by the disturbed patient who already feels that society
is conspiring against him. The psychiatrists are almost unanimous
in decrying the traumatic effects of a judicial hearing.
(2) The provision for a trial de novo or an appeal from the
commitment order is an adequate safeguard for the few contested
cases. To provide an initial hearing in all cases, contested and
uncontested, is a waste of time and effort, both for the court and
for the medical witness.
Most of the arguments against the ex parte procedure have
already been mentioned elsewhere in this paper, and can be
summarized as follows:
(I) There are serious doubts as to the constitutionality of
ex parte commitment.
(2) The traumatic effects of a judicial hearing can be lessened
or completely dissipated by the use of the flexible hearing procedures discussed in the previous section of this article, such as
the abolition of the mandatory presence of the patient, the release
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of the harmless patient to his family pending the hearing, and
others.
(3) When a patient is hospitalized without any judicial intervention, there is apt to be no consideration given to the need
for legal guardianship .
.(4) No matter how well drafted, the statutory release procedures are seldom adequate in fact. The patient who is already
in a hospital and wishes to contest the decision of the committing
doctor is often unable to find an attorney who can handle his
petition for release. It is generally agreed that the state hospital
systems of New York and California are among the best in the
country, yet there are three cases from these states in which a
patient's request to communicate with his attorney in order
to file a habeas corpus petition was refused by the hospital
authorities. 65
(5) Placing the primary responsibility for commitment on
the medical profession can injure the relation of trust between
the patient and the psychiatrist who will be treating him. Where
the patient suspects that all society is against him, the role of
the law as a scapegoat may help the doctor, who does bear ultimate
responsibility for the patient, to suggest that 'Tm on your side."
My own conclusion is that the best results can be achieved
by improving the judicial hearing rather than discarding it.
While the ex parte hearing seems to work in the states that have
adopted it, there is no strong trend in this country to dispense
with the judicial hearing. The Draft Act did not incorporate
the procedure, but concentrated on other areas.
If a particular state does decide to adopt the ex parte process,
the draftsmen should avoid simply copying the existing statutes
from states which already use ex parte procedures. Examination
of the statutes reveals two common defects:
(1) Of the fourteen states listed in Tables 3 and 4 of the
Appendix, in one state commitment results in automatic legal
incompetency and in four states the law is not clear on this point.
The lack of automatic consideration of the need for guardianship
is especially important in these five states and could cause considerable hardship where the patient is legally unable to deal
with his property and no substitute is appointed.
65 In re Hofmann, 131 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 281 P. (2d) 96 (1955); People ex rel. Jacobs
v. Worthing, 167 Misc. 702, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 630 (1938); Hoff v. State, 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.
(2d) 671 (1939).
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(2) In several of the states there is no specific release provision.
In such a state, the only method of gaining release is the writ
of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus procedure does not contain
many of the built-in safeguards, such as the right to appointed
counsel, that are contained in the more recent statutes which
establish a specific hearing procedure for commitment. The
commitment hearing statute is tailor-made to fit the needs of
the mental patient.
To meet the objections listed above, it is suggested that if
ex parte commitment is used:
(1) The procedure should be used only for the state
hospitals, and preferably only after an initial period of shortterm observation commitment;
(2) The patient should not be considered as legally incompetent;
(3) The patient should be informed of his right to appeal,
both by the examining physicians and by the hospital;
(4) The statute which establishes the appeal process should
be essentially the same as a well-drawn statute which governs
initial judicial commitment.
As a final note on ex parte commitment, conversations with
a number of psychiatrists and mental hospital administrators
have revealed that most of them are under the impression that
the Draft Act provides for ex parte commitment on the certificate
of two physicians, as an alternative to the judicial commitment
found in section 9. The source of this misconception is the ambiguous wording of section 6-A. This section provides that a
mentally ill individual may be admitted to a hospital on the
certificate of two doctors. This section authorizes admission, not
commitment. The section provides for what is usually called
"non-protested admission," but fails to provide expressly that
admission depends on acquiescence, rather than compulsion. Part
B of section 6 and the commentary to the act make it clear that
compulsion can not be used unless the procedure is also an
emergency situation. 66 Misunderstanding would be avoided if the
effect of a protest were expressly stated, as it is in most states
with similar statutes.67
66 Draft Act, at 24.
67 For example, California

§§6610.1 to 6610.4.

Welfare and Institutions Code (Deering, 1952; Supp. 1957)
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2. The Constitutional Problem. 68 A fairly recent constitutional
development is the principle that in certain cases due process
requires no more than one opportunity to be heard, and if the
the full hearing is available at some stage, preliminary action
need not meet any formal requirements. Most of the cases in the
United States Supreme Court have involved the taking of property
without a hearing. Thus when a condemnation statute contains
an adequate provision for payment of compensation without unreasonable delay, the taking may precede the compensation. 69
The taking may be contested by an appeal de nova or by allowing
the owner to sue the government in a separate action and either
kind of proceeding will justify the prior administrative seizure.
In a recent case the court indicated that the due process clause
will be satisfied where property is seized prior to the judicial
hearing, even though the burden of proof in the hearing is placed
upon the owner. 70
The Supreme Court cases have concerned the taking of property rather than liberty, and it is not clear just how far the court
would go in upholding the deprivation of a person's liberty by
an order which did not follow a hearing, where adequate review
was provided for at a later date. In the Falbo case the Court held
that a selective service registrant could be punished for failing
to report for induction, even though the induction order may
have been invalid.71 In this case the Court indicated that some
liberty could be curtailed by administrative order, and the proper
remedy for the registrant was to report to the induction center
and at that point contest the order in a court.
The principle has been extended to commitment cases by
the state courts, and ex parte commitment for an indefinite time
has been upheld where the patient could obtain a full hearing
reasonably soon after commitment.
It is clear that if ex parte commitment is to be sustained, the
68 There is very little ,writing on the constitutional aspects of ex parte commitment.
In spite of its title, the article "Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement,'' 3 STAN.
L. REv. 109 (1950) is concerned solely with commitment after a hearing before an administrative or quasi-judicial agency.
69 Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945); Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106
(1934); Am. Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North,
271 U.S. 40 (1926); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); Braton v. Chandler, 260
U.S. 110 (1922); Hays v. Seattle, 251 U.S. 233 (1920); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919);
Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
70 Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 357 U.S. 197 at 210-212 (1958).
71 Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
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statutes must furnish adequate procedures by which the patient
may test his detention after he is admitted. Habeas corpus is not
always adequate because some states use it to test only the legality
of the original detention and do not inquire into the mental
illness of the petitioner at the time the writ is requested. However,
most states now provide by statute for a full judicial hearing on
request of a patient to determine present mental illness, or by
statute have enlarged the habeas corpus proceeding so that it
performs the same function. The two leading cases which uphold
summary commitment both emphasized that any due process
defects in the original commitment would be cured only by an
unlimited right to full review by habeas corpus or other proceeding in the nature of an appeal.72 A number of other states are
in accord,73 although there are some courts which have held
otherwise. 74 Most of these latter decisions can be distinguished
on the ground that adequate review procedures were not available.
The conflicting views are illustrated by the two most recent
decisions. In both cases adequate review procedures were provided,
and yet the courts reached opposite results, in both cases by a
unanimous bench. In Hiatt v. Soucek75 the Iowa court held that
indeterminate ex parte commitment was valid, even though the
statute failed to provide expressly for an appeal. The court conceded that if habeas corpus was limited, as it was at common law,
to testing the legality of the original detention, the commitment
would be unconstitutional. However, the court held that the
Iowa habeas corpus statute was broad enough to permit a determination of whether the plaintiff is in fact a proper subject for

72 In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897); In re Crosswell, 28 R.I. 137,
66 A. 55 (1907).
73 Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W. (2d) 76 (1935); In re Mast, 217 Ind. 28,
25 N.E. (2d) 1003 (1940); In re Bryant, 214 La. 573, 38 S. (2d) 245 (1948).
74 Barry v. Hall, (D.C. D.C. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 222. See Rivers v. Munson, (D.C. Cir.
1941) 125 F. (2d) 393. The Barry case is the most recent one in which a court flatly states
that the Dowdell and Crosswell cases, note 72 supra, were wrongly decided, and that an
ultimate hearing was not sufficient to avoid due process defects. The Barry case may be
distinguished on the grounds that the federal habeas corpus statute does not afford a
complete rehearing. Also, the statement was dictum, as the statute involved was not a
commitment statute. One court has indicated that although indeterminate commitment
on an ex parte order might be defective, detention for a limited time is permitted without
a hearing. In re Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 73 A. 1078 (1909). A later case held in effect that if
adequate appeals provisions are provided, indeterminate commitment is in reality only
provisional, and due process would ,not require an initial hearing. In re Cornell, 111 Vt.
525, 18 A. (2d) 304 (1941).
75 240 Iowa 300, 36 N.W. (2d) 432 (1949).
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detention. 76 The Missouri Supreme Court reached a contrary
result on the constitutional issue in State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax77 where it was held that the release provisions of the Draft
Act, no matter how adequate, could not cure the defects inherent
in summary commitment. Apparently, the court was bound by
earlier Missouri cases which held that a defect in commitment is
not cured by a right to full review by habeas corpus.
In conclusion, the majority of cases have held that summary
commitment is valid and that the due process of law is satisfied
where an adequate appeal provision is included. An additional
point is that this principle can not be extended to allow summary
action which involves serious irreparable injury. Corporal punishment, for example, once inflicted can not be undone and no
appeal could cure the lack of an initial hearing. Thus a statute
which permits ex parte commitment and provides that the patient
becomes legally incompetent and a guardian can be appointed
for his estate without notice to him is probably unconstitutional.
"Whether commitment to a mental hospital is such 'irreparable injury' depends largely on the point of view. A court
imbued with the feeling that commitment of a person to a
' "lunatic asylum" stamps him with the stigma of insanity, and
degrades him in public estimation,' may well refuse to allow
such serious action to be taken without first giving him his
day in court. A different result might be expected from a
court which sees no logical or scientific basis for differentiating mental from physical ills so far as the propriety or need of
hospital care is concerned, which does not regard a scientific
examination by experts as a 'summary' procedure or as less
likely than a judicial verdict to reflect a correct result on a
question of this kind, and which is convinced of the psychiatric wisdom and sound public policy of sparing the mentally
ill from the harmful effects of formal judicial notice and
hearing insofar as it is safe to do so." 78
76 Iowa Code (1958) §229.37 ,provides: "All persons confined as insane shall be entitled
to the benefit of the writ of :habeas corpus, and the question of insanity shall be decided
at the hearing." The Draft Act contains a provision (§22) which preserves the right of
habeas corpus, without indicating whether the court can inquire into the present justification for detention, as in Iowa, or is limited ,to the propriety of the original commitment.
South Carolina, which has adopted most of the Draft Act, including §22, has recently
held that the reference to .habeas corpus in the commitment statute did not impliedly
repeal the common law rule that the issue of the petitioner's present sanity could not be
determined in a habeas corpus action. Douglas v. Hall, 229 S.C. 550, 93 S.E. (2d) 891 (1956).
77 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W. (2d) 72 (1954).
78 Weihofen and Overholser, "Commitment of the Mentally ID," 24 TEX. L. REv.
307 at 347 (1947).
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LEGAL R.!GH.TS OF THE COMMITTED PATIENT

The first part of this article has been devoted to the procedures
for admission or commitment. Post-admission provisions are also
important and are frequently incorporated in the commitment
statutes. After the patient is admitted to the hospital, his principal
concern is the quality of psychiatric care which he will receive.
This, of course, is a medical problem beyond the scope of this
paper. It is important to note, however, the various statutory
provisions which affect the legal status of the patient during his
hospitalization. Some of these statutes involve limits on the
patient's exercise of his normal civil rights and others are more
directly concerned with the medical treatment which he receives.
Some of these provisions apply only to the short-term patient,
while others apply to all mental patients. The patient's right to
release or to contest the need for compulsory hospitalization is one
of the most important of his rights. Release procedures have been
discussed as part of the commitment procedure, and are therefore
excluded from this section.
In some of the more recent mental health codes, provisions
which affect the civil and medical rights of the patient are grouped
together in a single chapter or section entitled "Patients' Rights
and Care" or "Rights of the Mental Patient." Part IV of the Draft
Act, "Provisions Applicable to Patients Generally," 79 has been
referred to by one author as a "Patients' Bill of Rights." 80 Similar
codifications of the patients' rights are found in the 1946 Louisiana Mental Health Law, 81 the 1951 Pennsylvania Mental Health
Act, 82 and the 1957 Texas Mental Health Code. 83
While in principle the enumeration of patients' rights may
be objectionable as impinging upon the executive authority of
the hospital, in practice they probably do not interfere with
orderly administration, and in the main reflect the present standards of care in our better-run mental hospitals. The author's
Commentary to the Draft Act states: "Some of the individual
rights specified would seem to be necessarily implied from the
function of a mental hospital. The creation of a sympathetic

79 Draft Act, §§19-26.
80 GUITMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
81 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 28, §171.

82 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954)
83 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon,

314 (1952).

tit. 50, §§1481-1484.
1958) arts. 5547-68 to 5547-87.
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public attitude toward the operation of this Act will, however,
be facilitated by express provisions guaranteeing such rights." 84

A. The Relationship Between Commitment and Legal Capacity*
The terms "capacity" or "competency" refer to the ability of
a person to perform acts which the legal order will recognize as
effective. Although there are special restrictions applied to aliens
and those who have been convicted of crimes, the general rule
is that all adults are treated alike in their capacity to make deeds,
contracts, gifts, etc. 85 The principal exception to the rule involves
those who are considered legally incompetent by reason of mental
illness. The usual statement of this exception is that legal transactions will be ineffective if the individual did not have sufficient
mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of the particular transaction. The rule is easy to state but difficult to apply,
partly because of the difficulty of determining the fact of incompetency, and partly because the law must strike a balance
between the interests of incompetents and the interests of businessmen and others who deal with them. The courts are generally
agreed that where an individual has been adjudicated incompetent by a court, and a guardian appointed, the legal acts of the
individual are void. The courts will usually not inquire whether
the individual was in fact mentally incompetent as long as he
is under an active guardianship. The more frequent and much
more difficult problems arise where the individual is not under
guardianship, but where other evidence, including evidence of
hospitalization as a mental patient, is introduced in a suit to set
aside a deed, contract, will, etc.
The prospective patient, his family and friends, are apt to be
concerned with the legal effect of hospitalization on his compe84 Draft Act, at 34.
• The problem of legal capacity in contract law is discussed in a special student
study, "Mental Illness and the Law of Contracts," p. 1020 infra.-Ed.
85 Most of the cases involve the capacity of a person to make a deed, contract or will,
but ·the problem of mental incompetency is coming up in other contexts with increasing
frequency. Thus mental incompetency of a parent may justify the adoption of the child
without consent of the parent. Nebstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill. (2d) 511, 121 N.E. (2d) 781 (1954).
A person who is incompetent can not bring a divorce action, either in person or by his
guardian [Shenk v. Shenk, 100 Ohio App. 32, 135 N.E. (2d) 436 (1954)], but can bring
a separation action in person [Sengstack v. Sengstack, 4 N.Y. (2d) 502, 151 N.E. (2d) 887
(1958)]. S,ee also on the divorce problem: Turner v. Bell, 198 Tenn. 232, 279 S.W. (2d)
71 (1955). On mental incompetency as a defense to a divorce action, see HARPER, PROBLEMS
OF THE FAMILY 706 (1952).
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tency. The problem is of special concern to the borderline patient
who is admitted at an early stage of his illness. Does the fact of
admission mean that he is deprived of the power to perform legally
effective acts? Unfortunately, the law on this subject is confused
and uncertain, and both courts and legislatures have had difficulty
in determining the relationship between hospitalization and
competency. The difficulties have been caused primarily by three
factors:
(1) The traditional rules of incompetency are phrased in
terms of one conclusion (incompetency) following from another
conclusion (insanity), rather than from a specific set of facts; i.e.,
the rules say, "If a person is insane, he cannot serve on a jury,
vote, make a deed or will, etc." rather than, "If a person is a
patient in a mental hospital, he cannot vote, etc." The basic
source of confusion is the use of a dual terminology. In the older
statutes and cases, the same term "insanity" was used indiscriminately to mean the condition which justified the loss of legal
capacity and the prerequisite for admission to a mental hospital.
(2) A factor which has tended to perpetuate the confusion is
that commitment procedures are almost entirely statutory. Misled
by the indiscriminate terminology, legislative draftsmen have
generally failed to think the problems through and have occasionally introduced conflicting rules on the legal effect of hospitalization. On the whole, the courts have been able to work out the
policy factors quite well, but all too frequently they have been
handicapped by poorly drafted legislation.
(3) Most courts and legislatures have failed to recognize that
there are two separate aspects to the problem of the relation
between hospitalization and incompetency. The first problem is
one of administrative control over the patient, i.e., how far can
the hospital authorities go in denying the patient his normal
legal rights. The second problem is essentially one of evidence.
What is the value of evidence of hospitalization as a mental
patient in a later proceeding to appoint a guardian or to avoid
a deed, contract, or will? Is the evidence conclusive proof of the
patient's lack of capacity? Prima fade evidence? Of some slight
value? Or inadmissible and of no value?
Before considering in detail the relation between commitment
and incompetency, it is helpful to outline briefly the effect of
guardianship on incompetency. The two areas are analogous,
partly because the policy problems are similar, and partly because
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in many states commitment results in some form of guardianship.
I. Guardianship and Incompetency. The simplest problem is
the one where the individual is incompetent in fact. The legal
effects of incompetency are generally clear cut in any given jurisdiction and the existence of a court decree of commitment or
guardianship does not change the result. Generally, a contract
or conveyance made by an incompetent is voidable at his option.
The rules on avoidance, and the policy justifications, are the same
as those which allow the minor to disaffirm. Both the minor and
the incompetent are liable 'in quasi-contract for necessaries, and
this common law rule has been carried into the Uniform Sales
Act. 86 The one area where the incompetent has been treated with
less leniency than the minor is in the requirement of restitution.
In most jurisdictions the infant can disaffirm although he is unable
to restore the status quo, but the contract will bind the incompetent if he is unable to make restitution and the other party
to the transaction dealt with him without knowledge of his
incompetency.87
A problem which is less frequent, but much more difficult
for the law to handle, is the effect of deeds or contracts by a
person who is under guardianship, but who may be competent
in fact at the time of the transaction. The legal results can be
summarized as follows:
(1) A substantial group of courts hold that the appointment
of a guardian is an in rem proceeding which gives constructive
notice to the whole world of the incompetency of the ward, and
that this status continues until the guardian is discharged.
(2) Probably a numerical majority have concluded that appointment of a guardian is conclusive on the issue of incompetency
only at the time of the appointment, and a contract made by the
ward at a later date is valid if he is in fact competent.88
These are the policy arguments:
(1) Favoring the rule that guardianship is conclusive on incompetency. The guardian, and the court which appointed him,

Uniform Sales Act, §2.
cases are cited and analyzed in Virtue, "Restitution from the Mentally Infirm,"
26 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 132 (1951).
88 See annotations in 7 A.L;R. 568 (1920), supplemented in 68 AL.R. 1309 (1930). A
careful reading of the cases shows that in most of the cases which hold that the appointment of a guardian is conclusive, the statement is dictum, because the third party had
actual knowledge of the appointment of the guardian.
86

87 The
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are primarily charged with the responsibility for protecting the
property of the ward. This duty would be rendered very difficult
if the ward were left free to convey away property or make
contracts which could be enforced against his property, and the
issue of incompetency in fact were to be relitigated in each action.
(2) Favoring the rule that guardianship is not conclusive on
incompetency. If a person is in fact competent, the third person
who deals with him in good faith and is unaware of the fact of
guardianship ought to be protected. Realistically, the "constructive notice" that is given the world of business by the court decree
of guardianship is no notice at all, since most states do not maintain central records of guardianship decrees, and it is very possible
for a person to be adjudicated incompetent in one county and
have his business or property in another county.
There are several methods by which the competing policy
claims can be compromised. One method is reflected in a line of
cases from Ohio which hold that the appointment of a guardian
is conclusive evidence of the ward's incapacity to make a contract
or conveyance which directly conflicts with the authority of the
guardian, but as to matters which do not conflict with his authority, the adjudication is not conclusive. Thus the making of
a will or a contract of marriage would be valid if the ward were
in fact competent. 89 Another method is to extend protection by
statute to specific groups or individuals who are apt to deal with
incompetents at a distance, and who would be unlikely to discover the fact of guardianship. Thus several recent corporation
code revisions provide that a corporation and its stock transfer
agent are protected if they permit a stockholder of record to
exercise voting or ownership rights, unless the corporation has
actual notice of a court decree of incompetency or guardianship.90
The Ohio statute goes so far as to protect the corporation regardless of any actual notice.
2. The Case Law. As most of the problems concerning the
legal status of the patient after commitment are not dealt with by
statute, investigation seems most easily handled by first analyzing
the existing common law background, and then attempting to

89 Jordon v. Dickinson, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprints 147 (Superior Court 1887); Lee v.
Stephens, (Ohio App. 1942) 50 N.E. (2d) 622.
90 E.g., 1953 Wisconsin Corporation Code (Wis. Stat. §180.851), 1955 Ohio Corporation
Code (Ohio Rev. Code §1701.28).
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determine how far the common law has been modified by the
various statutes.
On the question of how far the hospital administrator can
go in denying a patient the exercise of his normal legal rights,
there are very few cases, and these tend to favor the patient. The
view of the courts is well illustrated by three recent New York
cases.
In People ex rel. Jacobs v. Worthing9 1 the court said as dicta
that the denial by a mental hospital of a patient's right to mail letters to his attorney was an unreasonable and unlawful interference
with the patient's rights.
In Hoff v. State92 a general order of the Department of Mental Hygiene provided that every patient had the right to communicate· free of censorship with the department, the governor,
district attorneys, and courts of record. The order further provided
that all other mail could be forwarded by the superintendent of
the hospital to the patient's guardian. Hoff, a patient in a state
hospital, executed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and mailed
it to his attorney. The superintendent, knowing what the letter
contained, forwarded it to Hoff's guardian, who apparently suppressed it. After gaining his release, the patient sued the state.
The court held that the superintendent could not rely on the·
general order, his act was a tort, and the state was liable for
damages.
In re Alexieff's Will involved the question of the legal effect
of a patient's attempt to exercise a right in violation of a hospital
regulation. A general order of the Department of Mental Hygiene
provided that ". . . no patient shall be permitted . . . to make
a will ... except upon the order of the commissioner or a judge
of a ... court of record...." 93 A patient executed a will without
attempting to gain the required consent. The court held that assuming the order were valid, violation of the order did not affect
the validity of the will. There was evidence that the patient was in
fact competent, and the will was admitted to probate.94
On the evidence issue, the courts have ranged from one ex91167 Misc. 702, 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 630 (1938).
92 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E. (2d) 671 (1939).
93 General Order No. IO, printed as a footnote to 34A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1951; Supp. 1958) §34.
94 94 N.Y.S. (2d) 32 (1949), afid. 277 App. Div. 790, 97 N.Y.S.• (2d) 532 (1950), leave
to appeal denied, 277 App. Div. 901, 98 N.Y.S. (2d) 582 (1950).
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treme to the other, saying that evidence of commitment is conclusive on the issue of competency, or that it is inadmissible, or
that its effect is somewhere in between. Handicapped by poorly
drafted statutes, many courts have, on the whole, failed to look
at the policy issues involved, so there is a wide divergence of
holdings and many unfortunate decisions.
Although the problem of the effect of commitment can arise
in almost an infinite number of types of proceedings, the courts
of any one state generally treat all of the cases alike, with the
sole exception of criminal cases. Even in those states which equate
hospitalization with incompetency, the universal rule is that
hospitalization is never conclusive on the issue of criminal responsibility. The courts which have passed on the problem frequently talk in terms of the time lag. The argument is that
although a defendant may be judicially committed, and then,
before discharge, commit a crime, the time interval between the
judgment and the act is great enough so that the defendant
might have recovered his sanity, and therefore he cannot be
conclusively presumed to be insane. However, in the one case
where the time interval was cut down to seconds, and the ink
on the commitment papers was literally still wet at the time of
the criminal act, the California court had no real difficulty in
upholding the conviction. 95
A minority of states hold, even in the absence of clear-cut
statutory directions, that commitment is conclusive evidence of
incompetency. These decisions are generally characterized by
rigid and mechanistic application of principles without any real
understanding of the policy problems involved. The courts tend
to reason that insanity means commitment and insanity also
means incompetency, so that commitment automatically results
in total legal incompetency. Typical of this inflexible failure to
differentiate between the policy issues bearing on hospitalization
and those bearing on competency is the Colorado case of Rohrer
v. Darrow.96 In 1901, Mrs. Rohrer was committed by the Denver
county court to a private mental hospital. In 1903, she was con95 In People v. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 P. 124 (1907), the defendant was taken
before the superior court for a commitment hearing. After testimony of physicians that
Willard was "insane, homicidal, and dangerous" the judge orally adjudged him insane
and committed him to the state hospital. As the judge began to sign the order of commitment, Willard drew a pistol from his pocket and shot and killed the complaining
witness. The conviction for murder was sustained.
96 66 Colo. 463, 182 P. 13 (1919).
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ditionally released to the custody of her husband. She spent the
next fourteen years working as a bookkeeper for her husband
who was a banker and real estate agent. Mrs. Rohrer was a partner
in some of her husband's enterprises, she purchased and sold land
in her own name and was a notary public. Apparently through
some oversight, she never received a formal discharge from the
mental hospital. In 1917, fourteen years after her .discharge from
the hospital, she sold a parcel of land to the defendant and shortly
thereafter sued to rescind the deed on the ground of incompetency.
There was no evidence of overreaching on the part of the defendant, nor was the purchase price inadequate, and the only evidence
offered on the issue of incompetency was the commitment of 1901
and the lack of any discharge. The trial court authorized a compromise of the suit and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that the lack of a hospital discharge was conclusive
proof of legal incompetency, the deed was absolutely void, and
no compromise of her rights would be permitted.
A more recent case which illustrates the same attitude is
Sanders v. Omohundro,97 an action to compel the buyer under a
land contract to accept a deed to the property. The buyer objected that title was defective in that the seller had purchased from
an illegally appointed guardian. The guardian had been appointed
by an Arkansas probate court without notice to the ward. Apparently, the only evidence of incompetency was a letter addressed
"to whom it may concern" stating that the patient was me:p.tally
ill, was confined in a private mental hospital in Dearborn, Michigan, and was incapable of caring for her person or property. The
letter was signed by a physician on the hospital staff. The Arkansas
court affirmed a decree of specific performance in favor of the
seller, stating that insanity is presumed from the fact of confinement. The court had no comment on the lack of notice to the
ward, either of the appointment or of the sale, nor did it object
to the lack of evidence of incompetency. Several other states have
also adopted the view that commitment is conclusive on the issue
of legal incompetency.98
97 204

Ark. 1040, 166 S.W. (2d) 657 (1942).
v. Cubbison, 45 Ariz. 14, 40 P. (2d) 86 (1935) (proof that defendant in
divorce action was committed and then discharged, but not judicially restored to competency is sufficient to vacate a divorce judgment when defendant was not represented by
a guardian ad !item); Walker v. Graves, 174 Tenn. 336, 125 S.W. (2d) 154 (1939) (four
years after commitment, general guardian could be appointed for :patient in a mental
98 Cubbison
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At the other end of the spectrum, a small minority hold that
evidence of commitment is not only not conclusive on the issue of
capacity, but is inadmissible. The two cases which are most frequently cited are Leggate v. Clark99 and Knox v. Haug. 100 In the
Leggate case, a wife sued to set aside a deed executed by her
on the ground that her husband, who joined in the deed, was
incompetent. The trial court ruled that the order of a probate
court committing the husband to a mental hospital was admissible
and prima facie evidence of incompetency. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the evidence was inadmissible and ordered
a new trial on the issue of incompetency, although there was other
evidence which tended to prove incompetency. In the Knox case,
a Minnesota decision, the owner of land deeded it to A, was then
committed to a mental hospital, and while on conditional release sold the same tract to B. The dispute was between A, the
first buyer, and B, the second buyer, who was fortunate enough to
record his deed first. The only evidence of the incompetency of the
seller was the evidence of commitment. The court affirmed a
judgment in favor of B, stating that a patient may be sufficiently
unbalanced to need treatment, but still be competent to dispose of his property. It is interesting to note that although the
case turned on the sufficiency of the evidence, the Knox case has
been repeatedly cited by digests, text writers, and other courts
as holding that the evidence was not admissible, an issue which
was not before the Minnesota court.101 The position taken in the
Leggate case has been severely criticized by Professor Wigmore102
and by a number of courts which have passed on the issue, 103
hospital without notice to him). See In re Ost, 211 Iowa 1085, 235 N.W. 70 (1931) (court
stated that it is improbable, if indeed not impossible, for a patient in a mental hospital
successfully -to force termination of guardianship prior to discharge).
99 111 Mass. 308 (1873).
100 48 Minn. 58, 50 N.W. 934
101 Apparently the writers have

(1892).
,been misled by the court's headnote to the effect that
commitment is " ••• not evidence of mental incapacity." This is an ambiguous statement
which could refer ,to either admissibility of evidence or sufficiency of evidence. When the
Nebraska court was faced with the issue of admissibility, it held that the evidence was
not admissible, citing the Knox case. Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276 (1893).
The Knox case is cited as standing for inadmissibility and disapproved in Martello v.
Cagliostro, 122 Misc. 306, 202 N.Y.S. 703 (1924) and Maas v. Territory, 100 Okla. 714,
63 P. 960 (1901).
102 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1671 (1940).
103 For an excellent discussion of the admissibility problem, see Rawson v. Hardy,
88 Utah 109, 39 P. (2d) 755 (1935) in which ,the court discussed the Leggate case and
others following it and disapproved of the rule.
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although it has been adopted by Nebraska and a few other
jurisdictions.104
The majority of states have held that evidence of hospitalization is both admissible105 and entitled to some weight in proving
incompetency. The most common expression is that commitment
results in a rebuttable presumption of incompetency (or is prima
facie evidence of incompetency) and that a final discharge from
a mental hospital results in a rebuttable presumption of competency.106 Weight of evidence is never a clear-cut thing like admissibility, and the courts shift back and forth between the
language of prima facie evidence and rebuttable presumptions.107
Some of the states treat the presumption as a true presumption
and require little or no additional evidence of incompetency.
There is a more recent and apparently growing trend to consider
the evidence of hospitalization of less weight. This recent line of
authority is hard to recognize, because the courts continue to talk

104 Keely v. Moore, 196 U.S. 38 (1904) (will contest-Supreme Court did not discuss
admissibility of the fact of the testator's commitment, but did hold that the commitment
papers were properly excluded, citing the Leggate case with approval); Lewandowski v.
Zuzak, 305 Ill. 612, 137 N.E. 500 (1922) (will contest-reversed and new trial where
testator's commitment papers introduced as evidence); Hicks v. State, 165 Ind. 440, 75 N.E.
641 (1905) (evidence of prior commitment not admissible to impeach witness); Wager v.
Wagoner, 53 Neb. 511, 73 N.W. 937 (1893); !Dewey v. Allgire, 37 Neb. 6, 55 N.W. 276
(1893) (action to rescind conveyance-commitment evidence inadmissible). But cf. Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 312 Mass. 165, 43 N.E. (2d) 779 (1942); Skelton v. State, 148 Neb. 30, 26 N.W.
(2d) 378 (1947).
105 The commitment is admissible only if it is not too remote in time from the acts
which are involved in the subsequent incompetency case. The courts generally say that
the trial courts have a wide discretion in determining the length of time which must
pass before the evidence .becomes immaterial. Since evidence of commitment is apt to
seem quite conclusive to a jury, the jury should -be carefully instructed on the weight
and effect of such evidence. Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 109, 39 P. (2d) 755 (1935) and
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1671 (1940).
106 One court has held that a final discharge is not necessary to restore the presumption of capacity, and that a conditional release is sufficient. Brewer v. Hunter, (10th Cir.
1947) 163 F. (2d) 341.
107 With the exception of criminal cases, most decisions on incompetency are equity
cases to set aside deeds, wills or contracts, etc., where the court determines both the law
and the facts. Court cases are especially difficult to analyze in terms of the language of
presumptions, since there is no sharp distinction between what the court tells the jury
and what the court bases its decision on. In these cases the term "presumption" may
have any one or more of the following meanings: (1) as a rule of procedure which changes
the burden of producing evidence and results in a directed verdict if no contrary evidence
is produced; (2) as a rule of procedure which results in the issue being put to the trier
of fact, even where no supporting evidence is introduced; (3) as a permissive inference
of fact; (4) as a label used in locating the burden of persuasion on a given issue: (5) as
an authoritative principle or assumption used as a starting point in legal reasoning;
and (6) as indicating a general policy disposition or attitude on the part of the court.
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of hospitalization resulting in a presumption. However, the results
reached by the courts show that either substantial additional
evidence of incompetency is required to justify a conclusion of
incapacity, or that very little rebutting evidence is required to
overcome the presumption.
An example of this modern trend is Finch v. Goldstein108
where Finch, a committed resident patient in a mental hospital,
sold a farm to the defendant, taking back a purchase money mortgage. After the sale was made, a guardian was appointed for Finch.
The guardian sued to foreclose the mortgage. The defendant
pleaded the incompetency of the grantor and asked for rescission
of both deed and mortgage and the return of his purchase price.
The court held that a deed and mortgage made prior to an adjudication of incompetency is not void, and that a judicial commitment is not such an adjudication. A number of other states
are in accord, both on the proposition that evidence of commitment alone is insufficient to justify a finding of incompetency,1° 9
and on the proposition not directly involved in the Finch case, but
implied in the decision, that the evidence is of slight weight.110
3. The Statutes. Only a handful of states have attempted to
work out the problem by statute. Many of the statutes are poorly
drafted and create as many difficulties as they settle. Most of the
state statutes which deal with the problem provide in general that
hospitalization as a voluntary or short-term patient does not

10s 245 N.Y.
100 Fetterley

300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927).
v. Randall, 92 Cal. App. 411, 268 P. 434 (1928) (evidence that contract
was made on same day that promisor iwas committed to a mental hospital held insufficient
to justify finding of incapacity to make contract); Fleming v. Bithell, 56 Idaho 261, 52
P. (2d) 1099 (1935); Knox v. Haug, 48 Minn. 58, 50 N.W. 934 (1892).
110 Watson v. Banks, 154 Ark. 396, 243 S.W. 844 (1922); People v. Willard, 150 Cal.
543, 89 P. 124 (1907); People v. Field, 108 Cal. App. (2d) 496, 238 P. (2d) 1052 (1951);
Livaudais v. Bynum, 165 La. 890, 116 S. 233 (1928); Vance v. Ellerbee, 150 La. 388, 90
S. 735 (1922); Quarterman v. Quarterman, 179 Misc. 759, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 737 (1943); Sullivan
v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 762 (1941); Martello v. Cagliostro, 202 N.Y.S. 703 (1924) (good
discussion of evidentiary value of commitment); Herr v. Herr, 56 Pa. D. & C. 421 (1946);
Ryman's Case, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 11 A. (2d) 677 (1940); Rawson v. Hardy, 88 Utah 109,
39 P. (2d) 755 (1935); and Western State Hospital v. Wininger, 196 Va. 300, 83 S.E. (2d)
446 (1954). See Topeka Water Supply Co. v. Root, 56 Kan. 187, 42 P. 715 (1895); Fay v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 220 Iowa 628, 263 N.W. 14 (1935). Not only is commitment
not conclusive proof of incompetency, •but a final discharge from a mental hospital is
not conclusive proof of competency, so as to justify termination of a guardianship. In
re Pfeiffer, 10 Wash. (2d) 703, 48 P. (2d) 158 (1941). The converse is also true. A judicial
order which restores competency and terminates a guardianship does not per se require
that the committed ward be discharged from a mental hospital. In re Zanetti, 34 Cal.
(2d) 136, 208 P. (2d) 657 (1949).
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involve loss of capacity, and either remain silent or specifically
provide that long-term patients do lose their legal capacity.
The Draft Act has attempted to give express recognition to
the difference between hospitalization and the status of legal
incompetency. One of the fundamental principles of the act is
that a patient who needs hospitalization is not necessarily legally
incompetent, and a person who is legally incompetent does not
necessarily require hospitalization. The preface to the act states:
"A statute having to do with the mentally ill is necessarily
one which deals with individuals who as a class are peculiarly
in need of the protective forces of society; public provision
of hospital care for the mentally ill generally is itself a recognition of this need. Decision as to hospitalization in the individual case, however, is one which as a rule needs to be
made in the light of the individual's entire situation, including the availability of alternatives which may be sufficient
or preferable, even from the medical point of view, in the
particular case. In those cases in which a guardian of the
person has previously been appointed, the guardian should
be helpful and will have a more or less authoritative role,
depending on the law of the State, in arriving at decisions
in the interest of the sick individual. Appointment of a guardian by the court may frequently be a desirable first step in
meeting problems growing out of the individual's mental condition of which his need for hospitalization may be only one.
"The Act, however, does not deal with guardianship as
such, nor does it make the status of incompetency a prerequisite to, or a consequence of, hospitalization.... [I]t is desirable
that jurisdiction for both types of proceedings should be in
the same court. . . . Procedurally, however, the determination that hospitalization is justified should be separated from
the adjudication of incompetency and the appointment of a
guardian. It is a fundamental theory of the Act that an order
of hospitalization decides no more than the question of hospitalization. " 111
Specifically, section 21 of the Draft Act provides:
"(a) Subject to the general rules and regulations of the hospital and except to the extent that the head of the hospital
determines that it is necessary for the medical welfare of the
patient to impose restrictions, every patient shall be
entitled ...
111 Draft

Act, p. 2.
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" (3) to exercise all civil rights, including the right to dispose of property, execute instruments, make purchases, enter
contractual relationships, and vote, unless he has been adjudicated incompetent and has not been restored to legal capacity.

* * *

"(c) Any limitations imposed by the head of the hospital on
the exercise of these rights by the patient and the reasons for
such limitations shall be made a part of the clinical record
of the patient."
Looking at the preface, the commentary, and the act as a
whole, several conclusions are apparent:
(1) It is clear that hospitalization under the act does not
result in total loss of legal capacity.
(2) It is also clear that the act does not guarantee the patient
the full exercise of his normal legal rights. The commentary to the
act mistakenly concludes that the act does guarantee the full
enjoyment of personal rights and that the loss of such rights can
result only from a guardianship proceeding.112 This conclusion is
incorrect, as limitations may be imposed by the hospital. However, the patient is protected against abuse by the requirement
that the limitations must be either by general rule or regulation,
or be incorporated in his clinical record. Thus the act apparently
leaves open the question of how far the hospital may go in denying the patient the exercise of his civil rights, and also the question raised in the Alexieff case,113 on the validity of the patient's
exercise of his rights contrary to the restrictions imposed on him
by the hospital.
(3) The Draft Act does not settle the evidence problem. It
would seem that the act does indicate a legislative policy which
requires that evidence of hospitalization is not conclusive and
ent~tled to slight weight in a proceeding where legal capacity is
an issue.
To date, of the six states which have adopted the Draft Act,114
four have adopted the Draft Act provision on civil rights.11 5 South
Carolina adopted section 21 of the act, which contains a general

112 Id. at 35.
113 Alexieff's Will, note 94 supra.
114 Idaho, Missouri, New Mexico,

Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah. For citations,
see Appendix I infra.
115 Idaho, Missouri, New Mexico, Utah.
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enumeration of patients' rights, but omitted sub-paragraph (a)
(3) which is the civil rights part of section 21.116
The lineup of the 49 states is given in the last section of
Tables 2 and 4 in Appendix I infra. The tables are only partly
accurate. Where there is no e~press statute on the subject, but
where there are references to the appointment of a guardian
in the commitment process, or where the statute indicates that
a discharge from the hospital will restore capacity, the state is
listed as merging commitment and capacity. Where there is no
statute or case law on the capacity of patients, the state is listed
as not merging commitment and capacity, although a court might
so hold.
The statutes of some of the states which have accorded express
legislative recognition to the problem are summarized or quoted
as follows:
(1) The states which go the farthest in separating commitment and capacity are Delaware and North Carolina. "Commitment . . . shall not raise any presumption against the sanity of
the person ... committed."117
(2) Wisconsin has enacted what is probably the majority rule
at common law. "Hospitalization under this chapter ... is not an
adjudication of legal incompetency, but merely raises a rebuttable
or disputable presumption of incompetency while the patient is
under the jurisdiction of the hospital authorities." 118
(3) Illinois and Texas are unique in that the court is required to consider the issue of competency, and has the alternative of committing as competent or incompetent.119
(4) In New York, the statute is silent on the evidence problem, although it seems to imply that hospitalization results in
incompetency. However, the New York courts have generally
considered evidence of commitment of slight weight in a subsequent case involving incompetency.120 On the issue of ad-

116 S.C. Code (Supp. 1958) §32,950.12. A later section implies that all patients lose
legal capacity. "The regular discharge of any person shall ipso facto restore to him all
his legal rights." §32-950.28.
117Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 16, §5126. Accord, N. C. Gen. Stat. (1958 repl.) §122-46.
118 Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.005(2).
119 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91½, §§1-8, 1-9; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art.
5547-51.
120 See the New York cases cited in notes 108 and 110 supra.

1959]

COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL

993

ministrative control over the patient, the statutes contain detailed provisions. The Mental Hygiene Law authorizes the hospital superintendent to act in a limited way as a guardian for
any patient who has no guardian. The superintendent may
receive up to $1,000 on behalf of the patient, deposit funds in
a bank or invest in United States bonds, and may execute checks,
receipts or other documents for the patient.121 In addition, General Order Number 10 of the Department of Mental Hygiene
provides that no patient may accept service of process or execute
a will, conveyance, or contract without an order of a court of
record, except that patients may cash or endorse checks of less,
than $100 with the permission of the superintendent.122
(5) Florida, Georgia, Indiana, and Oklahoma expressly provide in general terms that patients who are hospitalized for an
indeterminate period are incompetent.
(6) One of the most specific statutes is that of Ohio:
" ... no patient in a hospital . . . or a patient on trial visit
therefrom, shall be competent to enter into any agreement
or execute a contract, deed, or other instrument unless it has
been approved and allowed by the court committing him by
an order entered on the journal of said court. A certified
copy of such order of the court shall be attached to such
contract, deed or instrument.
"The discharge of a patient shall not operate as a discharge of a legally appointed guardian of the person or estate
of such patient."123
In the Seabold case, the Ohio court held that a marriage contracted in Ohio by a patient on convalescent leave from an Ohio
mental hospital would be void, as an "agreement, contract,
deed or other instrument" prohibited by the statute, but a
marriage contracted outside of Ohio was valid if the patient was
competent in fact. 124
4. Summary. It seems clear that none of the statutes discussed above adequately handles the problem of control by the
hospital over the patient's affairs. As a practical matter, the hos-

12134A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §34(14).
122 General Order No. 10 is printed as a footnote to 34A N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1951; Supp. 1958) §34. See also text at notes 93 and 94.
123 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5123.57.
124 Seabold v. Seabold, 84 Ohio App. 83 (1948). See also 1956 Ohio Atty. Gen. Op.
#7106, p. 656.
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pital will have to exercise a substantial degree of control. On
the other hand, most authorities would agree that it is unwise
to equate hospitalization with complete loss of competency. Probably the Draft Act and New York provisions are the best available, as they recognize the need for control but provide some
safeguards for the patient.
Only three of the statutes spell out in specific terms the
answer to the evidence problem. On policy grounds it seems
clear that evidence of hospitalization should not be treated as
conclusive proof of incapacity. A sound argument can be made
for the view that the evidence should be admissible and should
be entitled at least to the status of a presumption which entitles
the party who produces the evidence to get to the jury. Psychiatric examinations are rare enough in criminal cases and, except
in a few states, are almost unheard of in civil cases, so that frequently the evidence of hospitalization is the only evidence available to the party who alleges incompetency. On the other hand,
if too much weight is attached to such evidence, it will discourage patients from seeking early psychiatric assistance. Another
factor is the increased use of out-patient clinics, conditional release, psychiatric social case work, and other recent procedures
which involve short periods of hospitalization and frequent discharge and re-entry, rather than a single period of long-term
custodial care. A change in legal status every few weeks would
be psychologically harmful to these "in and out" patients, and
would produce uncertainty of the law and of legal transactions.
In any event, it seems clear that hospitalization should not result
in a conclusive or even a very strong presumption of incompetency. Even formal commitment is a relatively summary process
compared with the usual guardianship proceeding, and each
procedure may involve medical and social questions which are
not relevant to the other proceeding.
My own conclusions are as follows:
(I) The problem is one which ought to be handled by statute.
(2) The Wisconsin statute is probably the best answer to
the evidence question, but it should be modified so that the presumption of incompetency applies only to the patient in the
hospital, and not to the patient on convalescent leave.
(3) The committing court should be required to consider
the problem of incompetency and the need for guardianship,
as the courts of Illinois and Texas are required to, with the
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help of a social case work investigation as in Minnesota, or with
the advice of a disinterested attorney, as in Oklahoma.
(4) The statutes should extend maximum protection to innocent third parties who deal with incompetents or those who
might be incompetent, whether they are hospitalized or under
guardianship. There are two methods, both of which could be
used. First, extend specific protection to classes of third parties
who are likely to deal with the incompetent at a distance, and
without knowledge of any facts which might indicate incompetency. The recent corporation codes of Wisconsin and Ohio
are examples of this type of statute,125 and the same principle
should apply to banks and insurance companies, as well as stock
transfer agents and securities brokers. Secondly, the guardianship laws should be amended so as to lessen the possibility of
an innocent third party dealing directly with a person under
guardianship. Specifically, the statutes should provide for a court
decree transferring title to the ward's realty to the guardian,
which decree could be recorded in every county where the realty
is located. The same statute would provide that in the absence
of such recording, the good faith buyer from the ward would
get good title.
B. The Patient's Right to Communication

While in theory the patient's right to unrestricted communication is a part of his general civil rights, to be protected or not
under the cases and statutes discussed above, in fact, this specific
right and a few others have been treated separately in detailed
statutes. The right of communication was the first right to receive
recognition and is the only right which is guaranteed by the
statutes of most states.
Some of the early legislation was enacted as a result of the
"anti-railroading" crusade of Mrs. E. P. W. Packard, a movement
which attracted wide popular and legislative support in the
1860's and 1870's. Mrs. Packard was the commitment victim of
her husband's conspiracy. She differed publicly with her husband, an Illinois preacher, on religious issues. He won the argument by committing her under a convenient and obviously unconstitutional statute which provided that a married woman
125 See

text at note 90.
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could be committed on the petition of her husband "without the
evidence of insanity or distraction required in other cases." 126
On her release, she began a vigorous and highly vocal campaign
to prevent unwarranted commitment. She was responsible for
the adoption in a number of states of the mandatory jury trial,
state inspection of private hospitals, and other legal safeguards
against "railroading," although she failed to persuade Congress
to guarantee the postal rights of mental patients. It is generally
agreed that her objective of obtaining legal safeguards against
the abuse of commitment proceedings was a worthy one. It is
unfortunate that her principal means used was the mandatory
jury trial involving a public trial whether the patient wants it or
not.121
Although a few modern statutes appear to recognize that a
patient's rights of communication are worth protecting as such,
most statutes clearly indicate that these rights are ancillary to
the right to release. The power of the hospital to supervise or
deny the patient visitation or postal rights may be misused as
a means of holding the patient incommunicado. An example of
the abuse which is possible even in a modern state mental hospital is found in the recent case of People ex rel. Jacobs v.
Worthing. 128 Jacobs was held in a New York state hospital for
four years. During all this time he sought release on a writ of
habeas corpus. The hospital regulations denied the patient the
right to correspond with his attorney or with any attorney, and
the hospital rigidly enforced the prohibition. After four years,
he finally succeeded in getting in touch with an attorney by
smuggled mail. The Supreme Court stated that the evidence
overwhelmingly favored his release and then severely castigated
the hospital for its unreason~ble restraint of his rights.
The older statutes authorize the patient to designate a correspondent outside of the hospital. Mail addressed to the correspondent must be forwarded without examination.129 The more

126 Ill.

Laws (1851) p. 98.
Packard case and its impact on state legislation is reviewed in a detailed
article, Dewey, "Lunacy Legislation in Illinois," 69 AM. J. INSANITY 751 (1912). See also
DEt.rrsCH, THE MENTALLY lu. IN AMERICA 423 (1946).
128 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 630, 167 Misc. 702 (1938). See also the Hoff case, discussed in the
text at note 92.
129 Fla. Stat. (1957) §§394.3 to 394.17; Mont. Rev. Code (1954) §§38-112 to 38-116;
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §25-0211; S.D. Code (1939) §30.0124.

127 The
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recent statutes extend the privilege of mail without censorship
to and from a selected class of persons or public officials. The
Draft Act provision is typical. Section 21 provides that subject
to the general rules of the hospital, and except to the extent
that restrictions are deemed necessary for the patient's welfare, the patient shall be entitled "to communicate by sealed
mail or otherwise with persons, including official agencies, inside
or outside the hospital; to receive visitors ...." 130 An additional
paragraph provides that: "Notwithstanding any limitations authorized under this section on the right of communication, every
patient shall be entitled to communicate by sealed mail with
the (central administration) and with the court, if any, which
ordered his hospitalization."131
Thus the act creates qualified privileges of correspondence and
visitation. The rights may be restricted by a general rule of the
hospital, or by an order of the hospital administrator, which
must be entered in the patient's records. The act also creates an
absolute right to communicate with the central state mental
health agency and the committing court. Criminal penalties are
provided for a denial of the patient's rights. 132 All of the six states
which have adopted the Draft Act have adopted its provision on
the right of communication.133 A number of other states provide
for a similar absolute privilege of correspondence with designated
officials or persons.134 The Draft Act and most of the other statutes
180 Draft Act, §21.
131Ibid.
132 Id., §26.
133 Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-346 (same as (Draft Act, except no absolute
right oto write state department of mental health); Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1958)
§202.847 (same as Draft Act); N.M. Stat. (1953) §34-2-15 (same as Draft Act); Okla. Stat.
(Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §93 (substantially same as Draft Act); S.C. Code (Supp. 1958)
§32-950.12 (same as Draft Act); Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-48 (same as Draft Act).
184 Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §7502 (no censorship of mail of
patient in state hospital to superior judge or district attorney); m. Rev. Stat. (1957)
c. 91½, §9-8 (no censorship of mail ,to governor, attorney general, court of record, state
attorney, dept. of public welfare or any attorney); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) §76-1222
(no censorship of mail to dept. social welfare); La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 28, §171 (no
censorship of mail to state dept. institutions or attorney); .Me. Laws Rev. Stat. (1954)
c. 27, §100 (no censorship of mail to •the state dept. institutions); Md. Code Ann. (1957)
art. 59, §35 (no censorship of mail to one correspondent or dept. mental hygiene); Mass.
Laws Ann. (1957) c. 123, §98 (no censorship of mail •to dept. mental health); Minn. Stat.
(1957) §253.11 (no censorship of mail to governor, public welfare dept., or one correspondent); N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 135, §33 (no censorship of mail to trustees of state
institutions); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 50, §1481 (no censorship of mail to
governor, dept. of welfare, court or attorney); R.I. Gen. Laws (1956) §26-3-20 (no censorship of mail to dept. public welfare); Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.35 (no censorship of mail
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appear to be unduly restrictive in that the absolute privilege
applies only to mail to public officials. The New York court, in
the Jacobs case discussed above, pointed out that public officials
may be unable or unwilling to act, and that the patient's attorney
should be included. The New York Department of Mental Hygiene, after being severely criticized in the ]acobs135 and Hoff 36
cases, both of which involved denial of mail privileges in habeas
corpus proceedings, changed its regulation. The present regulation is detailed and complete and would be an ideal model for
a state which wishes to incorporate the communication privilege
in its statutes. The regulation creates a qualified privilege as to
all mail and an absolute privilege relative to officials, attorneys,
and habeas corpus pleadings.137
A few states have adopted a qualified privilege statute, providing that mail privileges may be restricted under certain specified conditions.138 A number of states have similar statutes on
the rights of visitation.139 In only two states does the patient have
an absolute statutory privilege of writing to anyone without
censorship.140

C. Freedom From Publicity
As long as mental illness carries with it a stigma which does
not attach to other forms of disease, patients should receive legislative protection against possible social disgrace resulting from
publicity. The problem is especially important to the borderline
patient in an early stage of mental illness. The natural reluctance
of the patient's physician and family to expose "private family
troubles" in a court room open to the public often causes postponement of early treatment. The result is that many who could have
of patient in public hospital to governor, attorney general, dept. of public welfare,
district attorney, court, or attorney) and §58.05 (no censorship of mail of patient in private
hospital to dept. of public welfare).
135 See text at note 91.
136 See text at note 92.
137N.Y. Codes, Rules and Regs. (4th Supp. 1949), Dept. of Mental Hygiene General
Order No. 11.
138 Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §5751; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1958)
§§83-314, 83-315.
131! Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958) §17-189; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) -tit. 28, §171; Mass. Laws
Ann. (1957) c. 123, §99; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) ,tit. 50, §1481; Vt. Stat. Ann. (1959)
tit. 18, §2512.
140 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958) §17-190 (censorship of mail prohibited); Iowa Code (1958)
§§226.13, 229.39 (patient allowed to write once a week "what he pleases" to any person).
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benefited by prompt treatment are not hospitalized until their
condition is incurable.
There are two aspects to the problem-protection of the
hospital record and protection of the judicial record. The hospital
record and the records of physicians or health officers who participate in the commitment process are generally kept confidential
in the absence of legislation and in accordance with medical
ethics. The judicial record, however, is traditionally considered
a public record and in the absence of express legislation the
hearing, if any, and the resulting records are available to all.
Court records may be kept confidential both to protect the persons
involved in the commitment process from the patient, and to
protect the patient from adverse publicity. Experience under
recent Wisconsin statutes is a good example of both policy factors
at work. Judicial records involving all patients were made confidential in 1947.141 Subsequent to 1947, in two cases, released
mental patients assaulted those who had petitioned for their
commitment. In each case, it was discovered that the patients
had been in hospitals where trusted patients were allowed to
assist the staff in administrative duties and thus had access to
patient files. By this means, word got back to the patients as to
the names of those who had petitioned for their commitment. 142
On the request of the Board of County Judges the problem was
dealt with by the 1953 legislature. The present statute provides
that when the county judge fonvards copies of the commitment
records to the hospital, the names of the petitioners must be
deleted. 143
The Draft Act provides that judicial hearings may be held
in a non-public session in the discretion of the court.144 A number
of states have similar provisions. 145 Possible constitutional difficulties would be avoided if the statute expressly stated that the
patient may require that the hearing be public. The Draft Act
also makes confidential the records of courts, health officers, and
hospitals involved in the commitment process. The act provides:

141 WIS. Laws (1947) c. 485.
142 Letter to the author, dated

July 1, 1954, from the Hon. George Kroncke, Jr.,
County Judge, Dane County, Wisconsin.
143 Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.06(2) and §51.30.
144 Draft Act, §9(f).
145 E.g., Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-49; Wis. Stat. (1957) §51.02(2).
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"Section 23; Disclosure of Information."(a) All certificates, applications, records and reports made
for the purpose of this Act and directly or indirectly identifying a patient or former patient or an individual whose hospitalization has been sought under this Act shall be kept
confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person except
insofar
"(l) as the individual identified or his legal guardian, if any
(or, if he is a minor, his parent or legal guardian), shall consent, or
"(2) as disclosure may be necessary to carry out any of the
provisions of this Act, or
"(3) as a court may direct upon its determination that disclosure is necessary for the conduct of proceedings before
it and that failure to make such disclosure would be contrary
to the public interest.
"(b) Nothing in this section shall preclude disclosure, upon
proper inquiry, of any information as to his current medical
condition, to any members of the family of a patient or to his
relatives or friends.
"(c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not more
than $500 and imprisonment for not more than 1 year."
The Draft Act provision has been adopted in five states146
and somewhat similar provisions exist in five other states.147
An interesting side-light on the problem is afforded by a
recent action of th.e Idaho legislature. Idaho adopted section 23
of the Draft Act in 1951. In 1953, the statute was amended to
provide: "Nothing in this section shall preclude disclosure upon
proper inquiry, of any information contained in such ... reports
... to abstractors, title insurance companies in connection with
title matters relating to title to real property in which the patient
has or had some interest, lawyers. . . ." 148 While at first glance
it might seem that the legislature had misconstrued one of the
basic purposes of the Draft Act, i.e., the complete separation of
hospitalization and incompetency proceedings, nevertheless this

146 Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-348; Mo. Stat. Ann. §202.853 [repealed, Laws
1957, p. 672, §1]; N.M. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §34-2-17; S.C. Code (Supp. 1958) §32-950.14;
Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-50.
147 ID. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91¼, §4-5; Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §218.22; 34A N .Y. Consol.
Laws (McKinney, 1951) §§20, 34(9); Wash. Rev. Code (1953) §71.02.250; Wis. Stat. (1957)
§51.30.
148 Idaho Laws (1953) c. 264, §4, Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-348.
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amendment reflects a real problem. If a patient who is a resident
in a mental hospital is preparing to sell land, the buyer will
certainly know about the fact of hospitalization and might require
the appointment of a guardian or a judicial declaration of competency. However, where the patient is not a resident in a hospital,
but on conditional release, the prospective purchaser would have
a legitimate interest in inquiring of the hospital as to the seller's
current status. The Idaho exception is too broadly stated, as it
is difficult to see how the abstractor has any real interest. It should
also be noted that the amendment does not require disclosure;
it merely exempts the hospital authorities from criminal sanctions
for making disclosure. Another apparent defect in drafting is that
while title companies must be concerned with title, there is no
such qualification for abstractors and attorneys. Possibly a better
solution would be to require the central state authority (department of mental health), which keeps a roster of all patients, to
answer questions from attorneys and title insurance companies
as to whether or not an individual named in the request is carried
on the books of any mental hospital in the state, his current status
(resident or conditional release), and how long he has been a
patient.

D. The Patient and His Medical Rights
I. In General. A few writers have discussed briefly the topic
of proper medical care and the patient's right to such care. One
author has used the term "medical due process."149 The problem
is one which by its very nature cannot be solved by passing a
law. The principal barriers to effective treatment are inadequate
financing, an acute shortage of hospital beds and equipment,150
in some states a poorly designed administrative structure for
the state hospital system,151 and most of all, lack of trained
personnel.152
The Draft Act and the more modern commitment codes indirectly secure some elements of proper medical care by eliminat-

149 Comment,
150 The U.S.

56 YALE L.J. 1178 at 1203 (1947).
Public Health Service estimates that in 1950, 725,000 hospital beds
were needed for mental patients. Only 462,000 beds were available, and 63,000 of these
were sub-standard. Felix, "Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill," 107 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
712, n. 78 (1951). See also REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE 134.
151 REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE 70.
152 Id. at 149.
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ing admission procedures which are harmful to the patient. More
directly, section 19 of the act lists as one of the patient's "rights":
"Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment
and, to the extent that facilities, equipment, and personnel
are available, to medical care and treatment in accordance
with the highest standards accepted in medical practice."153
In addition, the act imposes on the hospital a duty to examine
each patient at least once every six months.154 As already indicated,
adequate personnel and equipment do not exist today and could
not be created overnight, even if funds were available. The Draft
Act provisions for the best medical care are relatively meaningless
at the present time and are little more than pious expressions
of hope. Section 19 is a statement of an ideal and certainly does
no harm, but it might better be included as a general policy
expression at the beginning of the act. 155 To date, provisions
similar to section 19 have been adopted by eight states, either
as general policy statements or as part of the "rights of patients"
chapter in the commitment statute.156
In addition to the general provisions on medical care, there
are two specific aspects of treatment which have received separate
legislative attention. One of these involves legal control over the
degree of mechanical restraint which may be imposed, and the
other involves legal control over the use of major and potentially
dangerous methods of treatment, such as surgery or shock therapy.
2. Regulation of Restraint. Of the many controversies in the
psychiatric profession during the last half of the nineteenth
century, none was more heated than the question of "restraint"
versus "non-restraint." 157 Eventually the advocates of non-restraint
carried the field and their ideas were written into the laws of a
number of states. Despite adverse publicity, the use of mechanical
restraints still plays an important role in our mental hospitals and

153 Draft Act,
164 Id., §15.

§19.

155 This has been done in Oklahoma. Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §2.
156 Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code Ann. (Deering, 1952) §6621; Idaho Code Ann.

(Supp.
1957) §66-344; Iowa Code (1958) §225.15; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1958) §202-840; N.M.
Stat. (1953) §34-2-13; Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §§2, 91; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann (Vernon,
1958) art. 5547-70; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-46.
157 The restraint controversy and the arguments on both sides is treated in detail
in DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY !LL IN AMERICA, c. XI (1946).
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will probably continue to do so as long as they are seriously understaffed.158 The Draft Act and ten of the states provide for statutory
controls on the use of restraints. 159 All of these require in substance that mechanical restraints may be used only when prescribed for individual patients as medically necessary, thus attempting to discourage the improvident use of restraints by ward
attendants. In addition, the Draft Act and most of the states require that a report of the restraint and the reasons for its use be
incorporated in the clinical record of the patient. In addition to
statutory controls, many states have administrative regulations on
the use of restraints. Perhaps the best of these is the recent and
carefully-drafted New York provision.160
3. Legal Control of Potentially Dangerous Treatment. The
administrators of mental hospitals are faced with the difficult
problem of how far they can go in administering serious or major
treatments which may involve some danger to the patient. Surprisingly, the issue has received little or no attention in legal or
medical literature.
The legal rules relating to surgery in a non-mental hospital are
fairly well defined. 161 Except in the case of an extreme emergency,
the physician may not operate without consent. An unauthorized
operation is a technical assault and makes the physician liable
in damages. The required consent must be given by the patient
or, if he is a minor, by his parents or guardian. The administration
of the rule presents very few problems, as the patient is almost
always willing to consent or, if he is a minor, the parents are willing to consent and are immediately available to give their consent.
Serious difficulties, however, are presented by the special characteristics of the mental hospital and its patients. The hospital
administrators work on the assumption that the consent of the

158 Current

practices regarding the use of restraints are summarized in REPORT TO
GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE 100, 303, and 354.
159 Draft Act, §20; Idaho Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §66-345; Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949)
§76-1223; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1959) §203.240; Mass. Laws Ann. (1957) c. 123, §§35-38; Mo. Stat.
Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1958) §202.843; N.M. Stat. (1953) §34-2-14; Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957)
tit. 43A, §92; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 50, §1481.1; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon,
1958) art. 5547-71; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-47.
160 The regulation is substantially the same as the Draft Act provision, except that
means of restraint and maximum periods of restraint are limited. N.Y. Code, Rules and
Regs. (5th Supp. 1949) Dept. Mental Hygiene General Order No. 7.
161 See cases collected in Horr AND Horr, LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
168 (1947).
THE
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patient is of no value, since a court might hold that he is mentally
incapable of giving effective consent. Most patients in the state
hospitals are public charges. Having no estate, most of them have
no guardian who could give consent. Many patients become
estranged from their families and, in addition, many patients are
hospitalized away frotn their own communities. Thus the hospital may have a great deal of difficulty in locating the relatives
and convincing them to grant consent. Some of these cases are
covered by the emergency exception to the consent rule. However, the emergency doctrine has been strictly limited by some
courts to cases where the operation is immediately necessary to
save the patient's life.162
Some hospital administrators contend that the provisions for
treatment of a committed patient in a public mental hospital may
be distinguished from the legal rules governing patients in medical
hospitals. The argument is that mentally ill persons are considered wards of the state. The state as parens patriae must provide necessary care and treatment. The care and treatment of
mental patients is a governmental function and the basic consideration in the exercise of this function is the patient's welfare,
not what the patient or his relatives believe to be in his interests.
Thus, consent is not legally required for the patient in a public
mental hospital. Although there are no cases squarely in point on
the issue of surgery without consent, there is one attorney general's opinion. Basing his conclusion on the above arguments, the
Vermont Attorney General concluded that the state mental hospital performed a governmental function in treating patients and:
". . . it is my belief that you may administer in your own
sound discretion such treatment [including surgery] . . .
as is indicated after diagnoses as being necessary or proper
for his welfare. As to the matter of securing the consent of
the inmate's relatives, it is my belief that such is not necessary
as a matter of law, but where it can be obtained, it is my
feeling that such a course is one to be commended."163
· The Vermont conclusion is buttressed by th~ language of
most commitment statutes to the effect that patients are committed
"to the state hospital for care and treatm'ent" 164 or that the state
162Id. at 176; REGAN, DocroR AND PATIENT
163 Vt. Atty. Gen. R.ep. 207-208 (1944-1946).
164 E.g., Draft Act, §5.

AND THE

LAW, 2d ed., §11 (1949).
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hospital has "exclusive custody and control of all patients."165
A few states have specifically dealt with the problem by statute.
Illinois is the only state which apparently provides that surgery
may be used in all non-emergency cases without consent. The
statute provides that the various forms of admission, including
voluntary and non-protested admission and emergency and formal
commitment "shall constitute the authority for the Superintendent
... for giving such standard treatment including surgery as may
be necessary for the welfare of the patient, or of the public."166
The statute applies to all mental hospitals, including private
hospitals, a fact which might cause constitutional objections. It
might be held that the doctrine of parens patricte could not be
stretched to authorize a private hospital to operate without consent. On the other hand, it could be argued that the care of all
of the mentally ill is essentially a governmental function and that
the superintendent of a private mental hospital is in effect a
state or quasi-state agent in the exercise of this function. A similar
Iowa statute applies to the state psychopathic hospital only. The
statute authorizes the physician in charge to ". . . proceed with
such observation, medical or surgical treatment, and hospital care
as in his judgment are proper and necessary." 167
Ohio and Oklahoma have almost identical statutes which
provide that except in emergency cases, the hospital may not
perform a major operation until the hospital notifies the guardian
or relative of the patient, if such information is in the patient's
records. 168 Note that the statute requires notice rather than consent. Under a literal interpretation of the statute, the hospital
could notify the relatives and then disregard a protest.
The Draft Act does not cover the problem of consent to
surgery nor do the statutes of any of the other states, although
almost every state has some general provision giving the hospital
authority to both detain and care for the patient. These provisions

165 E.g., Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §95; N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §17-33; Utah
Code Ann. (1953) §64-7-9.
166 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 91½, §§4-8, 5-18, 6-3.
167 Iowa Code (1958) §225.15. No such provision exists for the regular state mental
.hospital. But see id., §226.6(1). The 1957 Texas Mental Health Act has a provision similar
to Iowa Code §225.15; Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1958) art. 5547-70. Sterilization and
prefrontal lobotomy is specifically prohibited unless consent is given by a guardian. Tex.
Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp. 1958) art. 3174b-2.
168 Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5123.03; Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1957) tit. 43A, §96.
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could be liberally interpreted to allow the hospital to treat without consent.
The statutes discussed above all relate to the problem · of
surgery. In recent years, another problem has plagued mental
hospital administrators: the legality of the use without consent
of major types of non-surgical treatments. Specifically, these treatments are the shock and fever therapies. The electro-shock treatment has been widely adopted since it was introduced into this
country from Italy in 1939, and is the most widely used of the
shock therapies. The treatment results in the patient losing consciousness and experiencing convulsions and violent muscular contractions. Although fractures were common when the therapy
was first used, the present incidence of complications is less than
one percent. The effectiveness of the treatment is now well recognized for certain mental disorders, especially the manic-depressive
psychoses. Some state hospitals do not use such special therapies
without the consent of the relatives. It is felt that the treatments
are sufficiently dangerous that the rules of consent which apply to
operations should be applied here. Other hospitals do not require
consent, although they do make some effort to obtain it. There
are no cases or statutes which specifically cover the point, although
the Illinois statute discussed above is probably broad enough
to include shock therapy. The only detailed discussions of the
medical and legal aspects of the problem are contained in two
1948 attorney general opinions, one from Pennsylvania and one
from Wisconsin. Both opinions conclude that neither voluntary
nor committed patients in a state hospital, nor their relatives
or guardians, have any control over the type of treatment used.
Under its police power, the state may advance the medical and
psychiatric welfare of a patient by means of electric shock or
other well-recognized therapies, including prefrontal lobotomy,
without first obtaining consent.169
E. Conclusions
Primarily for historical reasons, our hospitalization statutes
have stressed the procedural problems involved in getting the
169 Pa. Ops. Atty. Gen. 120 (1948); Wis. Ops. Atty. Gen. 502 (1948). See also Ohio
Ops. Atty. Gen. No. 7106, p. 656 (1956), which holds that a patient admitted under a
short term ex parte commitment can be given only emergency treatment, unless valid
consent is present.
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mental patient into a hospital, and have almost completely ignored
the legal problems which may arise after the patient is admitted.
On some of the minor details, such as protection of the patient's
postal rights, or protection against unwarranted mechanical restraint, substantial agreement has been reached and is generally
embodied in legislation. However, on the broader and more
fundamental problems involving the effect of hospitalization on
legal capacity and the types of treatment which may be administered without consent, there is no general policy agreement and
most of the statutes are silent. These more basic problems are
difficult to solve and no ready-made policy determinations are
presented here. What is important is that the state legislatures
recognize that there are policy questions to be decided. When the
nature of the problems are understood, then the psychiatrists,
hospital administrators, and probate judges can be called in and
asked to help to provide specific solutions.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Table 1. Indeterminate Judicial Commitment-Pre-Hearing Procedures
Justification for Commitment
Court
Draft Act
Public Health Serv. Pub.
No. SI (1951)

I not

specified

Danger

Needs Treatment

Application Sup•
ported by Medi•
cal Certificate

Notice of Hearing
Relative

Guardian

Patient

X

X

X

X

X

(1)*

Pre-Hearing Medical
Exam Ordered by Court
by 2 specially qualified
physicians

X

X

1

physician

Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
(1949) C, 51•4

probate

not stated

not stated

1

physician

Ariz. Rev. Stat. (Supp.
1958) tit. 36, c. S

I superior

X

2

physicians

Ark. Stat. (Supp. 1957)
§59-234

I probate

X

Cal. Welfare and Inst.
Code Ann. (Deering,
Supp, 1957) Div. 6

I superior

X

X

Colo. Rev. Stat. (Supp.
1957) c. 71, e. 124•3

I county

X

X

Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev.
1958) tit. 17, e. 306

I probate

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

district or

X

X

X

X

111. Rev. Stat. (1957) c.

probate
-----any court of

X

X

X

X

91¼

record

Ala. Code (1940) tit. 4S 1-p_ro_b_a_te_ _ __

Fla. Stat. (1957) tit. 27, I county
c. 394
Ga. Code Ann. (Supp.
1958) c. 35-2, c. 49•6
Idaho Code (Supp. 1957)
tit. 66

Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1953 rep!.) tit. 8; (Supp.
1957) tit. 22, c. 47

I ordinary

I

circuit or
superior

X

(1)
X

X

X

X

2

physicians

2

physicians(0)

X

2

physicians

X

1

X

2

X

citizen and

i
2

doctors

physicians

X

same as Draft Act

X

only when application
not supported by med•
ical certificate

(optional)
X

~

~
z

X

(1)

X

~

X

2

physicians

i
,--,

~

r"
Cj't

*The numbers in parentheses refer to the notes following this table.

"

Iowa(5)

Code

(1958)

§§225-229

Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949; probate
Supp. 1957) c. 59-20, 22
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1959) c.

1-1

insanity
commission

circuit

202

X
X

X

not stated

not stated

X

La. Stat. Ann. (1950;
Supp. 1957) tit. 28

district

Mc. Rev. Stat.
c. 27, §no

municipal board
of cxaminc11 or
probate court

X

X

Mass, Laws Ann. (Supp,
1958) c. 123

superior or
district

X

X

X

Mich, Stat, Ann, (Supp,

probate

not stated

not stated

X

X

X

X

1 physician ( optional)

X

2 physicians

X

coroner and one physician

X

2 physicians

X

1 physician and 1 psy•

(1957)

C,

probate

X

(1)

chiatrist if available
2 physicians
2 physicians(")

X

525

'--'

~

a::

~
0

t:j

Miss. Code Ann. (1942;
Rec, 1953) tit, 4, c, 2
and tit. 25, c. 3,

chancery

X

X

Mo. Stat. Ann, (Supp,
1958) c. 202

probate

X

X

Mont, Rev. Code (Supp,
1957) tit, 38 and tit. 91

district

X

Nev. Rev, Stat. (1957)

district

J, Stat, Ann, (Supp, county

1958) tit, 30, c. 4

N, M, Stat, (1953)

X

X

X

X

not stated

2 physicians

X

2 physicians

X

2 physicians
2

l

domestic
relations
or juvenile
C,

X

X

X

C, 433

N,

c.o
(,j"(
c.o

C')
(1954)

1957) §14,811

Minn, Stat,

1 pbydclan

X

X

physicians

~

~

~

~

.....

X

X

~

t=:

district

X

X

any coult of
record

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

(1)

34•2

34A. N,Y.(")
Consol,
Laws (McKinney, Supp,
1958)
N,D, Rev, Code (Supp.
1957) tit. 25

(8)

by 2 specially
qualified
physicians
X

X

X

X

(1)

1 physician

(1)

t physician

1-1

0
0

c.o

,_.
0
,_.

Table I, Continued

0
Justification for Commitment
Court

Danger

Needs Treatment

Application Supported by Medical Certificate

Notice of Hearing
Relative

Guardian

Patient

Pre-Hearing Medical
Exam Ordered by Court

Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, Supp. 1958) c, 5123

probate

X

X

X

(1)

1 physician

Okla, Stat. Ann, (Supp.
1957) tit, 43a

county

X

X

X

X

2 physicians

Ore, Rev. Stat.
Rep!,) tit, 35

probate

X

X

X

2

Pa, Stat, Ann, (Purdon,
1954) tit, so

common picas

X(B)

R,I, Gen, Laws (1956)
tit. 26

district or
supreme court

S.C. Code (Supp. 1958)
tit, 32

probate

(1957

(8)

S,D. Code (1939) tit,
30; 1953 Laws, p. 187

X(B)

X(')

X(')

X

X

not stated

not stated

by

2

physicians

s::

X

physicians

X
X

X

X

(1)

2 physicians
1 physician

X

X

Tenn, Code Ann, (Supp.
1957) tit. 33

probate

X

X

Ann,

probate

X

X

X

X

X

X

Utah Code Ann, (1953; district
Supp, 1957) tit. 64, c, 7

X

X

X

X

X

(1)

2 physicians

X

X

2 physicians

Tex, Civ. Stat,
(1958) tit, 92

Va. Code (Supp. 1957)
tit. 37

circuit
corporation or
trial justice

X

Wash. Rev. Code (Supp,
1955) tit, 71; 1957 Laws
87

superior

X

W. Va, Code Ann, (1955;
Supp, 1958) C, 27

(10)

Wis, Stat. (Supp. 1958)
c. 51

county or
district

not stated

2 physicians

(D)

2

not stated

X

2 physicians

X

(1)

2

X

X

ti
...,::r.:
~
.z

i

i
~

physicians

physicians

.--,

~

r'

Cl

....:r

Wyo, Comp, Stat, (Supp,
Jg57) C, SJ

district

Summary: 43 States

Probate: J6
Trial Court: J6
Trial Court or
Probate: 7
Administrative
Agency: 4

1 Court

X

(1)

X

2 physicians

.....
f.O

(j'(

Danger: 4
Needs Treatment: s
Either Ground: 28
Not Stated: 6

Mandatory: J6
Optional: J

24

J2

Mandatory: 22
Discretionary: J2

Mandatory: 34
Discretionary: 3

has discretion 10 omit notice to patient if notice would be meaningless or harmful to patient because of his mental condition,
2 Court commitment is for 6o days, Court order becomes an order for indeterminate detention on certificate of hospital,
•statute refers to "necessary or advisable for him to be under care," but court held that only justification for commitment is danger, Commonwealth v. Noyes, 83 Pa, D, & C, 3u
(1952),
.
'Commitment statute allows commitment of either group, but discharge statute requires discharge of non-dangerous patient on application for habeas corpus. §26-3.Jo,
GThcrc arc two types of judicial commitments in Iowa, plus ex partc commitment, The proceedings referred to in the table above and in Table 2 involve a hearing before a quasi•
judicial agency, the county insanity commission, which consists of an attorney, a physician, and the clerk of court, This procedure is used for commitment to any mental hospital (state,
county, private or United States veterans' administration) excepting only the psychopathic hospital at the state university medical school, A separate and exclusive procedure is provided for
the psychopathic hospital, involving a hearing with optional jury before the superior or district court,
0 Thc hearing is held by the panel of two doctors who make a personal examination and also hear witnesses, The court commits the patient if it approves the findings of the panel,
7 Court may also appoint one psychologist and may appoint welfare agency to make a social case study investigation,
8 Thc hearing is held by the mental health board, a quasi-judicial agency with judicial powers (immunity, subpoena, etc,), consisting of the county judge, one attorney, and one
physician,
•Notice to patient may be dispensed with if notice would be harmful and If guardian ad !item appointed,
10 Hearing before quasi-judicial commission consisting of judge, prosecuting attorney and clerk of county court,

f.O
1-.J

C)
0

s::
s::

~

l.,:J

~
0

l'rj

i

~z

~
~

~
.....
0
.....
.....

Table 2. Indeterminate Judicial Commitment-Hearing Procedures
Mandatory Hearing

Right To Be Represented
by Counsel

Court-Appointed
Counsel

Draft Act

X

X

X

Alabama

X

Alaska

X

X

Arizona

X

X

compensated

Jury Trial

Reference to Hearing
Commission
optional-I referee

(')*

X

mandatory

Docs Commitment Automatically Result in
Incompetency?

X

Callfornia

(0)

X

compensated by state

X

no-except that restrictions may be imposed
for medical reasons
no-except that guardian can be appointed
for committed patient without notice to him
[§36-214(E)]

forbidden

yes-(Laws, 1957, c. 164)

Colorado

X

X

compensated
by county

(8)

no

X

X

Florida

X

X

Georgia

X

Idaho

X

Illinois

X

no-but public guardian may be appointed
without notice to patient
mandatory(8)

compensated
by county

no
yes(•)

t"'4

I yes

I

compensated
by county

optional-referee
6 jurors-I
a physician

~

8
....:::i::
~
z

mandatory reference to yes-commitment and guardianship arc one
panel of a physicians and proceeding
1 attorney. Commitment
is by court

X

N)

(5)

Arkansas

Connecticut

......
0
......

I same as Draft Act

I

optional reference to committing court must designate patient as
panel of two physicians competent or incompetent

Indiana

X

X

X

yes(')

Iowa

X

X

X

yes

Kansas

X

X

X

6 jurors-I
a physician

Kentucky

X

X

X

mandatory(8)

Louisi:ma

(")

~

i

I

optional reference to yes-guardian may be appointed In commit•
panel of two physicians _m_en_t_o_r_d_er_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
yes-but no provision for automatic guard•
ianship
optional reference to I no
panel of one physician
and coroner

.--,

~
~
(j(

"

Maine

X

Massachusetts

(8)

.....

(.0

no
X

Ol
(.0

no

L-.J

Michigan

X

Minnesota

X

Mississippi

X

Missouri

X

Montana

X

Nevada

X

New Jersey

X

X

New Mexico

X

X

New York(')

(1)

North Dakota

X

Ohio

X

Oklahoma

X

Oregon

X

every

no
hearing may be held by yes-guardian may be appointed for patient
commissioner or clerk
without notice to him
X

same as Draft Act

X

yes-guardian may be appointed as part of
commitment procedure

X

no-but committing court shall appoint guardian on application of any interested person

C')
0

a::
a::

~

t,l

discretionary
with court
X
X

X

compensated

X

no

~

optional

no-Draft Act provision

0

testimony may be taken yes-by administrative order No. 10
before referee

X

X

South Dakota

X

X

optional-referee

yes

~

yes-guardian appointed by committing court

z

(10)

Tennessee

X

Texas

X

X

• The 11umbers In parentheses refer to the notes following this table.

t,l

~

testimony may be taken not stated
before panel of 2 physicians and I attorney

~

testimony may be taken no

l=!

.

X

~

no-Draft Act provision

before 3 commissioners

South Carolina

1,:1

optional-referee

yes-Ore. Rev, Stat. §426.305

compensated

X

optional

X

X

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

yes-public guardian appointed for
committed patient

X

~

not clear
no

X

(11)

no-but committing court Is required to
determine if oaticnt ls comoctcnt

.....
0
.....
()I)

Table 2, Continued

1-1

0
1-1

Mandatory Hearing

Right To Be Represented
by Counsel

Court-Appointed
Counsel

Utah

X

X

optional with court

Virginia

X

X

Washington

X

X

West Virginia

X

X

compensated

Wisconsin

X

X

optional

Wyoming

X

Summary
43 States

Jury Trial

Reference to Hearing

Commission

hearing held by panel of no
judge and 2 physicians
yes

X

21

25

1-1'-

no-Draft Act provision

optional-referee

yes-guardian appointed for every committed
patient

X

no-results in rcbuttable presumption of in•
competency

expressly forbidden

yes-guardian appointed in commitment proceeding

X

Not stated: 1
Mandatory: 38
If asked for: 4

Docs Commitment Automatically Result in
Incompctcncy1

Mandatory:

No: 23
Yes (in whole or part): 18
Not stated: 2

2

Discretion
of court: 2
If demanded: n

~
....
C')

::i::
....

~

z

1 Hearing

required if a friend or relative of patient demands it,
•court order is for 6o-day commitment. Order becomes an indeterminate commitment on certificate of hospital,
is before commission of two physicians but commitment is by the court. If patient objects to findings of commission, he can demand jury trial,
'Hearing is ex partc, no notice to or presence of patient is required. Use of jury is in discretion of court, not the patient.
•committing court must designate patient as competent or incompetent, and if incompetent may appoint guardian, Ariz, Rev. Stat, Ann, (Supp, 1958) §§36-514(D),
6 Judicial commitment and incompetency proceeding arc merged in one action. If court fmds incompetency, it may or may not commit.
7Commitment is equivalent to adjudication of incompetency and guardian may be appointed at time of commitment, or if guardianship is asked for in subsequent proceeding, fact of
continued hospitalization plus physician certificate of incompetency is conclusive on fact of incompetency, §§8-120,
8Ky, Op. Atty, Gen, 39, 583 (1957),
9 No hearing unless requested by patient,
10 Hearing is before court, but preliminary hearing is held before panel of two physicians and one attorney who make findings as to both incompetency and need for hospitalization,
11 Jury trial mandatory unless expressly waived by patient or relative and attorney ad !item,
8 Hearing

r
<I

<;

!,j

b:1

<
::;:
,.,

~

Table 3. Ex Parte Indeterminate Commitment-Admission Procedures
Justification for Commitment
Commitment by

Approved by

Admission Reported to
Danger

Draft Act
Public Health Serv,
Pub, ,/#51 (1951)

2 physicians

judge or health officer

X

Patient Informed of
Right To Appeal

Needs Treatment

I

state mental health
agency

X

r--,

~
C'C
....:t

I-'

lO
jArk. (") Stat. Ann.
1957) c. 59•2

(Supp. 1 physician

(.;I

X

lO
L-...1

Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev, 1958) physician, attorney and superior court
§17.181
one other person

not stated

not stated

t Del. (1) Code Ann.
1956) c. 16-51

not stated

not stated

(Supp. 2 physician,

Fla. Stat. (1957) §394.21

2

Iowa (6) Code (1958) c, :,.:,.7

2 physicians

physicians

tMd. Code Ann. (1957), art. 59

2

physicians

Miss. ~) Code Ann. (1942; Rec.
1953) 6go9-12

2

physicians

county judge

director of state hospital

X

("}

X

X

not stated (ll)

not stated(2)

X

X

(8)

tNcb. Rev. Stat. (1958)
c. 83(3)(b)

probate judge

tN.C. (1) Gen. Stat. (1958 rep!.) state hospital(')
c. 122

not stated

not stated

clerk of superior court

X

X

Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 2 physician,
1957) tit. so

hospital superintendent

not stated

not stated

S.C. (1) Code (Supp. 1958)
§32-912

probate court

X

X

Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) 2 physicians
tit. 64, c. 7

judge or hcalth officer

X

tvt. Stat. Ann. (195g) tit. 18, 2 physicians
c. 61

magistrate

X

Summary: 14 states
ln 6 states ex partc commitment
is only method.

~
~

~

t,::I

X

fN.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 135 2 physicians

2 physicians

state mental health
agency

X

~
~

state board of health

~
X
X

Danger: 3
Needs treatment: 1
Either ground: 5
Not stated: 5

~

t,::I

z

~
~

~

t In these states, ex partc commitment is the only procedure available for indeterminate commitment.
partc commitment is only to state hospital.
llCourt test is M'Naghten test (right-wrong) or danger. Salinger v. Supt., 206 Md. 623, 112 A. (2d) 907 (1955).
8Therc arc two forms of ex partc commitment: by a county board of mental health consisting of attorney, physician, and court clerk; or by two physicians.
'Initial commitment to state hospital is for 6o-day observation period, made by clerk of court after hearing, Final commitment is made ex partc by clerk on certificate of hospital.
•Ex partc commitment can be used only for county hospitals, private hospitals, or general hospital psychiatric wards. Sec note 5 to Table 1,

1 Ex

I-'

0
I-'
(.;I

.....

0
.....
0)

Table 4. Ex Parte Indeterminate Commitment-Post-Admission Provisions
Right to Be Represented by Court Appointed Counsel
Counsel on Appeal

Appeal to
Draft Act

court

Arkansas

.

Connecticut

superior court or habeas corpus

Delaware

chancery court

Jury Trial on Appeal

no-except that restrictions may be imposed by hospital for medical reasons

X

X

Does commitment automatically result in
incompetency I

no
no
mandatory

no-and commitment raises no presump•
tion of incompetency

Florida

county court

Iowa

district court

Maryland

law courts

Mississippi

chancery court or habeas corpus

not stated

Nebraska

district court or habeas corpus

no

New Hampshire

superior court

no

North Carolina

habeas corpus in superior court

no-commitment raises no presumption
of incompetency

Pennsylvania

habeas corpus in superior court

not stated

X

compensated

X

no
X

South Carolina

probate court

X

X

Utah

district court

X

optional

Vermont

probate court

Summary: 14 states

X

yes

X

no

not clear

• There is no appeal provision, but patient can bring habeas corpus in any court of record.

3

~

i~

no-draft act provision
X

4

....~
::i::
....
~
z
C')

mandatory: 1
optional: 3

not stated
no: 9
yes: I
not stated: 4
r---,

~
tJl

....:r
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APPENDIX II
The Judicial Commitment Section of the Draft Act
Sec. 9. Hospitalization upon court order; judicial procedure.
(a) Proceedings for the involuntary hospitalization of an individual may be commenced ,by the filing of a written application with the (probate) court by a friend, relative,
spouse, or guardian of the individual, or by a licensed physician, a health or public
welfare officer, or the head of any public or private institution in which such individual
may ,be. Any such application shall be accompanied by a certificate of a licensed physician
stating that he has examined the individual and is of the opinion that he is mentally ill
and should be hospitalized, or a written statement by the applicant that the individual
has refused ,to submit to examination by a licensed physician.
(b) Upon receipt of an application the court shall give notice thereof to the proposed
patient, to his legal guardian, if any, and to his spouse, parents, and nearest known
other relative or friend. If, however, the court has reason -to believe that notice would
be likely to be injurious to the proposed patient, notice to him may be omitted.

(c) As soon as practicable after notice of the commencement of proceedings is given
or it is determined that notice should be omitted, the court shall appoint two desiguated
examiners to examine the proposed patient and report to the court their findings as to
the mental condition of the proposed patient and his need for custody, care, or treatment
in a mental hospital.
(d) The examination shall be held at a hospital or other medical facility, at the
home of the proposed patient, or at any other suitable place not likely to have a harmful
effect on his health. A proposed patient to whom notice of the commencement of proceedings has .been omitted shall not be required to submit to an examination against his
will, and on the report of the designated examiners of refusal to submit to an examination
the court shall give notice to the proposed patient as provided under paragraph (b) of
this section and order him to submit to such examination.
(e) If the report of the designated examiners is to the effect that the proposed patient
is not mentally ill, -the court may without taking any further action terminate the proceedings and dismiss the application; otherwise, it shall forthwith fix a date for and
give notice of a hearing to ,be held -not less than 5 nor more than 15 days from receipt
of the report.

(f) The proposed patient, the applicant, and all other persons to whom notice is
required to be given shall be afforded an opportunity to appear at the hearing, to testify,
and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court may in its discretion receive
the ,testimony of any other person. The proposed patient shall not be required to be
present, and all persons not necessary for the conduct of the proceedings shall be excluded,
except as the court may admit persons having a legitimate interest in the proceedings.
The hearings shall be conducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent with
orderly procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the
mental health of the proposed patient. The court shall receive all relevant and material
evidence which may be offered and shall not be -bound by the rules of evidence. An
opportunity to be represented by counsel shall be afforded to every proposed patient,
and if neither he nor others provide counsel, ,the court shall appoint counsel.
(g) If, upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the record, the court
finds that the proposed patient
(1) is mentally ill, and
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain
at liberty, or
(3) is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital and, because
of his illness, lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with
respect to his ·hospitalization, it shall order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period
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or for a .temporary observational period not exceeding 6 months; otherwise, it shall dismiss the proceedings. If the order is for a temporary period the court may at any time
prior to the expiration of such period, on the basis of report ,by the head of the hospital
and such further inquiry as it may deem appropriate, order indeterminate hospitalization
of the patient or dismissal of the proceedings.
(h) The order of hospitalization shall state whether the individual shall be detained
for an indeterminate or for a temporary period and if for a temporary •period, then for
how long. Unless otherwise directed ·by the court, it shall be the responsibility of the
(local health authority) to assure the carrying out of ,the order within such period as the
court shall specify.
(i) The court is authorized to appoint a special commissioner ito assist in the conduct
of hospitalization proceedings. In any case in which the court refers an application to
•the commissioner, the commissioner shall promptly cause the proposed patient to be
examined and on the basis thereof shall either recommend dismissal of •the application or
hold a hearing as provided in this section and make recommendations to the court regarding the hospitalization of the proposed patient.
(j) The head of the hospital admitting a patient pursuant to proceedings under this
section shall forthwith make a report of such admission to the (central administration).

